Russia's Lacklustre Response to The New Generation of American Aircraft
The Su-57, also known by its NATO designation ‘Felon’, is a fifth-generation multirole fighter developed by Sukhoi and it marks Russia’s inaugural venture into stealth aircraft technology. Designed to succeed the air-superiority MiG-29 and the Su-27 jets, the Felon also aims to compete with the US-developed F-22, that is, the most capable aircraft out there.
The design of the Felon seeks to combine fighting and attack capabilities, allowing it to engage ground, maritime and airborne targets alike. The Su-57 features a larger internal carrying capacity than any other fifth-generation aircraft, including the F-22, the F-35 and the Chinese J-20. A pair of internal weapons bays allow the aircraft to accommodate up to four K-77M long-range radar-guided missiles, while significantly reducing its radar and infrared signature. The aircraft is powered by two engines capable of propelling it to speeds of Mach 2 without afterburners. It has a range of 3500 km at subsonic speeds and features thrust vector control, which greatly enhances its maneuverability. Additionally, the Su-57 is outfitted with advanced avionics, including an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar that allows it to electronically target in various directions without moving the antenna.
It is important to note, however, that much of the information available about the plane comes from self-reports by its producers and must therefore be taken with a substantial grain of salt. A further assessment of its capabilities turns out to be challenging due to the aircraft’s limited operational deployments, with the plane being essentially absent from the skies of Ukraine.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review also listed the Su-57 as a potentially nuclear-capable strike aircraft for intermediate range missions, reprising the role of the old Su-34. Russia is indeed not only substantially modernizing its non-strategic nuclear stockpile, but also enhancing its delivery capabilities, which include ships, ground forces and planes, which tends to lend credence to the Trump Administration’s assessment. As previously mentioned, Russia has been promoting the SU-57 as a worthy competitor to the American F-22. However, while the F-22’s entry into service dates back to 2005 and the aircraft’s manufacturing lines halted production more than a decade ago in 2011, the SU-57 only entered service in 2020. Not to mention that in the meantime the US also developed and fielded the F-35, which entered service in 2015 and is one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. While the Felon allegedly has some advantages in terms of speed, range, foot ceiling and payload capacity, the F-22 outclasses it when it comes to stealth. However, these performance differences can be easily explained by the fact that the SU-57 was designed to be a multirole fighter, while the F-22 was specifically built to achieve air superiority through air-to-air combat, thus favoring maneuverability and stealth at the expense of payload capacity.
This is why it would be more appropriate to compare the Su-57 with the F-35, which was also designed as a multirole stealth fighter. Being able to carry out strike and electronic warfare missions and featuring astonishing surveillance and intelligence capabilities, the F-35 was developed in response to the modern combat scenario, where close air-to-air combat plays a relatively minor role. While the F-35’s top speed of Mach 1.6 falls short compared to the SU-57’ Mach 2.2, its cutting-edge sensor-suite arguably makes it the more technologically advanced aircraft, providing the pilot with a degree of situational awareness that can significantly enhance mission effectiveness. Additionally, as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, “the United States is also incorporating nuclear capability onto the F-35, to be used by the United States and NATO allies, as a replacement for the current aging DCA”.
Regarding stealth capabilities, some expert assessments suggest that the Su-57 has a radar cross-section (RCS) comparable to that of a 4th generation F/A-18 Super Hornet without ordnance, and dramatically larger than the RCS of the F-35 and F-22, whose RCS is believed to be 5000 times smaller [7]. As its stealth capabilities are significantly less effective compared to its rivals, some Western analysts have suggested that the Su-57 may be more accurately classified as an advanced fourth-generation fighter rather than a true fifth generation one.
However, the most significant factor preventing the SU-57 from being on par with its American counterparts is its limited production numbers, which are unlikely to increase significantly.
Procurement Shortfalls From Design To Production
In 1979, the URSS began considering the development of a next-generation multirole fighter intended to be operational by the 1990s. Mikoyan was selected to lead the program and started developing the MiG 1.44/1.42. Nevertheless, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the project faced repeated delays due to a lack of funds, leading to dramatically increased costs and its eventual cancellation [9]. A brand-new program, the PAK FA, was started in 1999. Due to financial difficulties, the program sought to cut costs by developing a single multirole fifth-generation fighter to replace both the MiG-29 and the Su-27. This time, the Ministry of Defense selected Sukhoi over Mikoyan as the winner of the PAK-FA competition and lead designer of the project
To manage developmental risk and distribute costs, while bridging the gap with existing 4th generation fighters, Sukhoi implemented some of the plane’s technology and features in advanced derivatives of the Su-27, which was eventually procured and entered in service as the Su-35S in 2014 [13]. From the outset, Russia sought foreign partnerships to boost funding and secure significant export orders. India initially showed interest in the PAK-FA project by signing a contract to co-develop a derivative of the aircraft, until in 2018 it withdrew citing concerns over performance and costs as the aircraft did not meet their requirements.
Flight testing of the Su-57 was postponed due to unspecified technical issues, delaying the initial test flights from 2007 to 2010, when the plane finally completed its maiden flight. Unfortunately, the construction of the prototypes had been so delayed that over 450 flights had to be conducted using just five aircrafts [10]. During testing, early structural cracks were discovered in the airframe of the prototypes, leading to a challenging structural redesign. According to the plan outlined under the State Armament Program from 2011 to 2020, the serial production of the Su-57 was expected to begin in 2016. The Ministry of Defense planned to acquire 52 aircraft by 2020 and an additional 150–160 by 2025. In 2015, the program faced further setbacks and delays due to technical issues, India’s unclear commitment to the partnership, and Russia’s economic difficulties.
The latter were exacerbated by international sanctions imposed following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent drop in oil prices.
In the same year, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense announced a reduction in the aircraft production, scaling back the initial order to 12 fighters. Instead, the Air force would operate fleets of upgraded versions of the more affordable fourth-generation Su-35S and Su-30SM, comparable to the Su-57 except for the stealth features [11]. Eventually, mass production of the Felon was put on hold until the need for it arose. In 2019, following a 20% reduction in production costs, President Putin announced that 76 examples would be purchased and delivered to the Air Force by 2028, marking a significant increase from the previous plan, but still a substantial decrease compared to the original expectations of the program.
Serial production eventually began in 2019, and, despite the crash of the first production aircraft, the Russian Air Force received their first Su-57 fighter in 2020. Although the exact number of combat-ready Su-57 is unclear, some sources report that by 2024, the Air Force may have 22 aircrafts [14]. The estimated price of each Su-57, ranging from $35 million to $54 million according to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is notably lower than that of its Western counterparts [16]. However, this cost advantage also stems from Russia’s tendency to design aircraft for conventional warfare scenarios rather than for high-tech, multi-domain operations, which sensibly lowers development and procurement costs. Moreover, the Russian government heavily subsidizes the defense industry, allowing manufacturers to offer aircraft at more competitive prices.
Challenges and Constraints on the Modern Battlefield
Having spent much of its life in testing, the Felon has seen limited combat. While it has been deployed for operations in Syria, its role in supporting the offensive in Ukraine has been minimal.
Although information is far from certain, the Felon is believed to have conducted strikes, carried out Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions, supported electronic warfare efforts, and engaged in beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat. A January 2023 report by the British Defense Ministry noted that Su-57s were ‘launching long range air to surface or air to air missiles into Ukraine’, though presumably from within Russian airspace. In fact, Western intelligence suggests that the Kremlin has been cautious with its most advanced fighter jet, deploying it only in limited instances for long-range strike missions with stand-off munitions.
Moreover, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence reported that “on 8 June 2024, a Su-57 multi-purpose fighter jet of the aggressor state was struck at the Akhtubinsk airfield in Russia’s Astrakhan region, 589 kilometers (366 miles) from the line of contact,” [17]. Following reports of the strike, Russian military bloggers criticized the military for failing to build hangars to protect the Su-57s, pointing out that the cost of constructing protective hangars at every airbase would be equivalent to the price of just one Su-57, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
In the context of the war in Ukraine, the Felon could face significant challenges in achieving air superiority. The Su-57 may have an advantage in close air-to-air combat due to its maneuverability; however, its effectiveness may be constrained by the infrequency of such close-range engagements, as Ukrainian forces are likely to rely on air defenses and long-range missiles. These options pose less risk and are better suited to modern warfare, which increasingly involves drones, cruise missiles, and other stand-off weapons that operate at a distance. The Felon’s relatively poor stealth capabilities could make it challenging to evade these counterattacks, posing a significant threat to the aircraft. The integration of the Su-57's systems with Russian ground forces and other aerial platforms might not meet Western standards, and interoperability and data sharing could be limited, reducing the Su-57's effectiveness in coordinated operations. Ukraine, supported by NATO intelligence, is also employing advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems. In this environment, the Su-57’s avionics and sensors could encounter significant difficulties due to GPS jamming, radar spoofing, and communications disruption. Moreover, deploying a high-value asset like the Su-57 in the Ukrainian conflict carries significant risk, as the loss of one of these aircraft would not only be a major propaganda win for Ukraine but also potentially expose sensitive technology ro foreign adversaries, particularly with the involvement of Western allies supporting Ukraine.
In conclusion, the major issues with the Su-57 are its limited operational experience and its logistical sustainability: production is limited and expensive, and there have been delays and problems with the supply chain. The scale of Russian production is likely to remain modest and insufficient when compared not only to the F-35, which is produced at a rate of over 140 aircraft per year for both domestic use and international customers, but it falls short also when compared to the Chinese J-20, expected to see production exceed 120 aircrafts in 2024.
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