Historically a Difficult Relationship, but Is There Hope for a “Nuclear Renaissance”?
In recent years, Italy has faced a return to intense internal discussion regarding a possible revival of its atomic energy industry following European legislation aimed at tackling climate change and the energy crisis.
In the case of Italy, nuclear energy represents the ideal complement to renewable energy in the country's decarbonization efforts since it can supply reliable, continuous, and low-carbon power, answering the demand of the baseload (which is the minimum level of energy demand that exists at all times). These features can mitigate the unpredictable and intermittent nature of solar and wind sources and the presence of nuclear is able to eliminate the need for massive storage devices, guaranteeing a consistent supply of electricity regardless of the weather or the time of year. While other low-carbon baseload technologies like hydro and geothermal can be integrated with nuclear, it is not enough to cover the Italian demand.
The necessity for atomic energy is justified by the size and energy-intensive nature of the Italian industrial sector and the country’s limited exposure to renewables in crucial areas (since renewables’ production is concentrated in Sardinia, Sicily, and generally in regions distant from the primary energy consumption zones). Moreover, nuclear energy complements renewable energy sources by lowering reliance on unstable energy markets and stabilizing electricity prices over time, hastening the transition from fossil fuels, such as oil, gas, and coal. In fact, given their characteristics, nuclear is by no means a competitor of renewable energy sources, as some critics tend to think, but rather a substitute for fossil fuels.
However, the concept of "competition among sources" is flawed in itself, as all sources should be pragmatically considered to ensure an energy mix that is both environmentally efficient and economically competitive. A competitive energy mix has to provide for separate demands at different times, which makes proposals like 100% renewables unachievable, both financially and practically. Similarly, a 100% nuclear solution is superfluous, as cheaper renewables act as a better provider for discontinued energy consumption over time. For this reason, nuclear and renewable energy combine to create a reliable, secure, and sustainable energy mix that helps achieve Italian decarbonization objectives.
From Atomic Pioneers to the Creation of ENEL
Exploration of the civil use of atomic energy began after the end of the Second World War, with Italy founding its first scientific organization devoted to studying nuclear power in 1946. In 1952, the National Committee for Nuclear Research (CNRN), tasked with advancing atomic energy development and promotion, replaced this original organization.
Italy's nuclear aspirations were influenced by domestic and Cold War politics, with the United States aiming to advance atomic energy for peaceful uses while maintaining strategic dominance. Initially, the United States opposed funding the Italian nuclear industry for political security reasons, particularly due to the presence of a powerful communist party in Italian politics. Additionally, for economic reasons, the US supported oil as the primary energy source for the European recovery, a move that benefited American oil companies. Over time, this approach changed as the United States exerted more direct influence by giving their partners the much-needed technology (for instance, enriched uranium), which guaranteed Italy's reliance on American-controlled technology.
After its reorganization in 1960, the CNRN became the National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), known today as ENEA. In contrast to state-led programs by the CNRN, the U.S. supported private Italian companies like Edison, which created a conflict between private enterprise and state-driven policies, hindering Italy’s progress. These domestic disputes were a bigger factor in Italy's nuclear program's difficulties than US influence.
Italy's first civil nuclear reactor, the British Magnox gas-cooled reactor in Latina, entered service in 1963. Garigliano's boiling water reactor, the nation's first General Electric boiling water reactor built near Caserta, was also connected to the grid shortly after. At that time, Italy was considered one of the prime pioneers in this sector, only behind the United States and the UK. The Westinghouse pressurized water reactor at Trino Vercellese, near Vercelli (also called the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Plant), began construction in 1961. It is crucial to note that various businesses started these early initiatives before Enel was even founded in 1962 due to the nationalization of the electricity sector. In the following four years, the management of the three plants was transferred to Enel.
In retrospect, the nationalization of the Italian energy sector set back Italian nuclear development and overall Italian energy security, as it led the country through a spiral of poor decisions by the ENEL administration and the political class. What could have been an opportunity for efficiency, national security, and cost-effective strategic investments became a prison that held foreign investments away.
In the beginning, Enel expressed enthusiasm for an extensive nuclear program and launched a massive nuclear plant construction program in 1966 to achieve 12,000 MWe of nuclear capacity by 1980. However, this plan was almost immediately scaled down in favor of a significant investment in oil refineries at a low technological level; this choice proved to be profitable at first (when Italian pollution laws were very permissive), but it was financially catastrophic later on. The 1973 oil crisis put the Italian economy in a precarious position and further encouraged investments in atomic energy, following the principle of obtaining energetic independence. With nearly 60% of its energy coming from oil and an already saturated hydroelectric sector, Italy found in nuclear energy a powerful tool to meet its energy needs.
The only actual investment that came from the 1960s expansion plan was the ENEL bid to build a fourth nuclear power plant in 1967, with Caorso, close to Piacenza, being selected as the new plant’s site. Enel placed an order in 1969 for an 850 MWe boiling water reactor from a GE/Ansaldo partnership, and construction started in 1970, with the plant entering into service in May 1978. A comparison has to be made with France, which, between 1974 and 1980, responded to the energy crisis by financing the construction of 42 new nuclear reactors. On the other side of the Alps, the substantial investment in nuclear power undertaken by Paris decades ago is one of the factors that have led to French energy independence and to France’s current status as the world’s largest net power exporter.Seeking expansion opportunities in the sector and witnessing the scale of investment in neighboring countries, Enel embarked on an ambitious foreign investment campaign. In 1974, Enel purchased large shares in the ESK consortium and the EDF-led NERSA consortium, both of which were working on constructing nuclear plants on foreign soil (in France and Germany, respectively).
In the early 1980s, Italy began developing a standard design for reactors, with plans initially made for building 10 new power plants with 2x1000 MWe reactors for a total of 20 reactors. However, these kinds of plans were unrealistic considering the modus operandi of Italian politics - i.e., never trying to displease anyone for electoral reasons. In fact, the final project was drastically reduced, only approving the construction of 3 out of the originally-planned 10 plants - one in Piedmont (Trino Vercellese), one in Lombardy, and one in Puglia; these plants would be based on Westinghouse’s pressurized water reactor technology, but the final plan did not specify crucial information related to the siting of the plan or the division of responsibility between operators. Around the same time, in 1982, the construction of an additional power plant in Montalto di Castro, close to Viterbo, equipped with 2x982 MWe BWR reactors began. These projects paled in comparison to French domestic investments, leading Italy to lose its pioneering role in the nuclear sector.
However, it was still an enormous leap forward for that time, with Italy planning to more than sextuple (adding nearly 8000 MWe) its atomic energy production.
Italy's Nuclear Downfall
The Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 completely changed the cards on the table. Although a national conference on energy in February 1987 reviewed the components of the Italian nuclear program and expressed general technical optimism for continuing operation, the November 1987 referendum on nuclear energy struck down the Italian atomic sector.
In the following years, the nuclear power plants were permanently shut down, and decommissioning began. The whole industry was progressively dismantled, including the power plants and infrastructure related to fuel management, such as fuel cycle facilities. The crucial role in dismantling the nuclear sector was assigned to Sogin (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari), a newly established state-owned enterprise charged with managing the decommissioning of Enel's and ENEA's atomic assets and handling nuclear waste. The referendum also suspended investments by Italian firms in foreign atomic projects.
However, this changed in 2004 when a new energy bill made it possible for Italian and foreign companies to collaborate on nuclear joint ventures and import electricity. In 2008, plans were put forward for a gradual return of nuclear power plants on Italian soil. Enel did not lose any time and, between 2004 and 2010, bought shares in many foreign atomic projects, the most notable ones in France, Spain, Slovakia, and Russia. Legislation enacted in July 2009 foresaw a crucial role for nuclear power in Italy's energy policy, setting a 25% target for energy generation coming from nuclear power sources by 2030.
Interestingly, anti-nuclear political action extended beyond the national level, as some sub-national (regional) governing bodies passed laws to prohibit the construction of new nuclear plants within their territories. Although the Constitutional Court overturned these bills, this issue of autonomy and regional authority will come up frequently in this article.
While everything seemed to be set up for an Italian nuclear Renaissance, in January 2011, the Constitutional Court allowed a referendum on the re-introduction of atomic power. This referendum, held in June 2011, strongly opposed the government's nuclear initiatives, including the 2009 legislation for atomic power, stating that nuclear energy production was to be abandoned. In the end, atomic energy was doomed from the start.
The referendum was perceived more as a vote against Silvio Berlusconi and his government, with technical and economic considerations set aside to give the arena for a purely ideological fight between Berlusconi’s supporters and critics. Furthermore, the Fukushima incident in April 2011 did not benefit nuclear comeback.
Instead of objective and scientific discussion, the Italian media covered news in an emotionally manipulative and, in many instances, purposefully misinformative manner. A defeat in the referendum marked the beginning of the end for the Berlusconi IV government and ended Italy’s efforts for a nuclear revival, this time for good.
The Nuclear Issue Under Meloni
It looked like nuclear energy was in the past until February 2022, when international developments caused Italy to question its stand once again. The Russian invasion of Ukraine resulted in an energy crisis that hit the European economies, with Italy being among the most exposed. Some economies paid a higher price, such as Germany, while others managed the crisis with way less effort, such as in the case of France.
This energy crisis reopened a debate in Italian politics and civil society, with the Draghi government finding itself in the spot to find new sources to cover the Italian energy demand. It is important to note that the Draghi government was a large and heterogeneous technocratic government, supported by almost all political forces, from Lega to the Five Star Movement. This meant that, despite its large majority (559/630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 274/321 in the Senate), it enjoyed limited breadth for maneuver.
The only significant party that did not support this government was Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. Ecological Transition Minister, Roberto Cingolani, made plans to mitigate the harsh impact of the energy crisis on the Italian economy by seeking out new supply lines. An ambitious plan was put forward, including a cutdown on energy consumption in summer to meet winter needs, an increase in investments in renewables, and the construction of new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to secure alternative suppliers that would make up for Russian gas. As a final consideration, Cingolani informally paved the way for a return to nuclear energy as a partner for renewables, publicly supporting the return of nuclear energy throughout his term.
The Draghi government successfully managed the initial stages of the energy crisis but did not last long enough to see the winter, as it collapsed in July and was subsequently substituted by the Meloni government after the Centre-right coalition won the 2022 general elections.
The past two years have seen the country’s return to a political phase similar to 2009 and 2011, with regards to the relationship between parties and nuclear energy. A crucial actor is Gilberto Pichetto Fratin, chosen as Roberto Cingolani’s successor for the position of Environment and Energy Security Minister (Cingolani’s renamed ministry). Pichetto Fratin has openly expressed his support for the return to nuclear power on various occasions, and similar enthusiasm has come from different figures from the governing parties (Brothers of Italy, Lega, Forza Italia). However, the government has done little to nothing on the matter for the past two years, a sluggishness that is made hard to understand by the comparatively historically surprising stability and comparatively strong majority of the current executive.
Two factors which make the oft-cited justification for the government’s reticence to capitalize politically and economically on a long-term investment such as nuclear power (i.e., fear of an immediate and strong backlash by public opinion) somewhat moot. Despite the government’s strength, ministers and other government officials have often expressed themselves in very vague and sometimes inconsistent ways on the topic.
For example, Brothers of Italy declares itself in favor of nuclear energy, supporting research into nuclear fusion and small modular reactors (SMR), while some members even expressed support for advanced third-generation reactors, such as the Minister of Enterprises and Made in Italy, Adolfo Urso. Similarly, Lega affirms that it supports funding for research into SMR reactors and nuclear fusion but maintains a dubious stance on advanced third-generation atomic power.
Lastly, Forza Italia states that it supports investments in gas and the newest nuclear energy generation technology but is unclear on its support of third or fourth generation technology; they also declare that they favor investment in nuclear fusion research and building SMR power plants.
However, confusion on the issue is also present in the two main opposition parties. The Democratic Party has maintained an overall uncertain position on the issue; whereas the party leadership and, by and large, the electoral base are generally skeptical for both political and historical reasons, some prominent members and a non-negligible share of the base are in favor.
The only significant political force that openly opposes nuclear power is the Five Star Movement, which proposed a reform in the European taxonomy to exclude nuclear power in its 2024 European Parliament Elections program. In general, these two parties assume a skeptical position on the topic, in contrast to the government’s support for nuclear energy in a dynamic similar to the one Italy faced in 2011, where atomic energy was used merely as a tool for political confrontation.
Another political party vehemently opposed to nuclear power is the Greens-Left Alliance. Considering the history of green parties around Europe, it is hard to imagine a different position. The party recently proposed to keep nuclear power out of the Net Zero Industry Act's list of strategic technologies. Both the Five Star Movement and the Greens-Left Alliance maintain a firm opposition to any kind of investment in nuclear energy, sometimes supporting anti-scientific policies or economically inefficient and unrealistic solutions, such as achieving 100% renewable energy production to cover Italy’s energy needs.
Italia Viva, +Europa, and Azione form a disorganized group of centrist/liberal parties. They declare their general support for the most advanced nuclear technology currently in use (advanced third-generation), although not all of their members are in favor. However, it is worth mentioning that the parties that hold the strongest positions on nuclear power, such as the Greens-Left Alliance and the liberal parties, are not politically relevant, with their current situation unlikely to change in the near future.
Nonetheless, the dual nature of political party positions has long been a general issue in the Italian political system. Local sections of the parties, backed by local committees and environmental organizations, have always opposed the construction of extensive infrastructures. This happened even if the party’s secretariat or the majority of the parties were in favor of infrastructural investments at the national level, whether the matter was energy, like nuclear reactors or even wind farms (as for the current case of wind farms in the Sardinia region), transportation (like the Turin–Lyon high-speed railway), or even when it has come to building infrastructure strategic for the national interest; this type of "NIMBYism" is a pervasive issue in Italian society.
The National Radioactive Waste Repository and its research center (which, needless to say, do not pose any security or health threat to the local population) will store radioactive waste generated not only by decommissioning former nuclear power plants in Italy but also by the research sector, the pharmaceutical industry, and the medical field. The repository could be built in 51 potential locations on the national territory, as highlighted in the CNAI (the national map of eligible areas).
The siting decision has not been made due to regional bills and local protests against construction of the deposit. For instance, in May 2024, the Lazio regional council unanimously (and, therefore, with the votes of the parties in the national government) approved a bill prohibiting the construction of the repository on the region’s territory. Out of 51 identified possible locations for the national repository, 21 are located in the province of Viterbo alone, in the Lazio region.
The fundamental issue at stake is that Italy is currently paying exorbitant fees to either stack its radioactive waste on dispersed deposits on national territory or export it overseas. An issue of particular relevance to Italian national interest that first surfaced during Matteo Renzi’s tenure as PM in the mid-2010s, and since no government had the will or strength to address it with the needed urgency.
A Glimmer of Hope?
A grass-roots campaign in support of nuclear energy has come to the fore over recent months with the intent of bringing nuclear power back to Italy. A popular initiative bill (a type of law submitted directly from citizens to the Parliament) titled "Nuclear Energy in the National Electricity Mix Now" was put forth on October 17, 2024. The law aims to restore the legal framework for building and operating nuclear power stations in Italy.
Alongside it, a campaign named "Energia Nucleare? Si, Grazie" was also launched at a conference held at the Chamber of Deputies on October 24, with academics specializing in nuclear systems, prominent civil society organizations, media personalities and political figures all throwing their weight behind the proposal. The campaign was able to gather enough support for the bill that, over the course of just five days, it received the 50,000 signatures needed for it to be presented to Parliament.
This result could reshape the current situation, coming to the aid of an inactive executive and supplying the groundwork on which to build a national nuclear policy. Nevertheless, enthusiasm may be short-lived. While this practice confers citizens the power to become policy initiators, it does not ensure that requests are discussed by parliament.
On top of this, there is no procedure that ensures any form of procedural priority (i.e., no mechanism that ensures that a popular initiative bill will be granted priority over other bills); parliamentary bodies are not required to voice their opinions on popular initiatives, and, even if they do, they can opt to schedule the bill’s hearings at such a date that ensures they will not be examined.
Conclusion
The current executive doesn't seem particularly interested in investing in nuclear energy, using the topic as a mere electoral promise. In their first two years in power, the ruling parties rarely did anything concrete despite public overtures for nuclear investments and announcing plans to the European Commission and the Italian public.
No real plan has been laid out, and no site has even been discussed, as the government maintains an ambiguous position (hypothetical support that never materializes into concrete action, while stalling on the national repository issue).
On the other hand, the main opposition parties have shortsightedly distanced themselves from an essential tool to reach climate goals and decarbonize the Italian economy only to rally against the Meloni government’s position. For these reasons, and given Italy’s political context, any change in Rome’s nuclear policy seems unlikely, and an Italian Nuclear Renaissance appears very distant.
Nuclear energy is essential to achieve Italy’s energetic independence and decarbonization of its energy sectors, as it is the perfect partner for renewables such as solar and wind energy. The Italian government should prioritize these investments in the energy sector, and the fact that none of the main political parties is addressing this topic in a remotely serious manner is worrying.
However, external circumstances like a new energy crisis could bring a rapid shift to the current status quo, which is obviously not what anyone would want. Nonetheless, if this country's problems can only be seriously addressed in emergency situations, shock therapy should be reconsidered.
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