Will Berlin's new radicals upend its foreign policy?
After a prolonged period of societal crisis, Germany is set to witness three consecutive state elections in its eastern regions this September, with results that promise to upset. As the summer ends, radical parties on the fringes of the political spectrum are expected to emerge as political winners, just in time to gain momentum ahead of the 2025 general election. The domestic positions of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly formed but potentially equally radical Die Linke splinter party Union Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) are worth analysing on their own. However, these two parties also share a notable commonality: their significant departures from the orthodoxies of German foreign policy.
Germany’s most pressing foreign policy issues have largely remained consistent over the past decade. Three key issues stand out. First, Germany's relationship with Russia, including its stance on the Ukraine conflict and, since 2022, Putin’s war against Ukraine, has been a topic of domestic debate since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Second, Germany's role in the European Union and the future structure of common European institutions have been under discussion since the Euro crisis of the early 2010s and the migration crisis of 2015. The third major issue is how Germany, either in collaboration with or independent of the EU, should address the growing assertiveness of China and the US's attempts to contain it. The AfD and BSW have gathered support by championing positions that no other party has dared to endorse.
Of course, different parties represent various perspectives on these issues. Yet, at a fundamental level, the parties of the "middle" - the CDU, SPD, Greens, and FDP - agree on the general direction Germany should take. This consensus includes maintaining close transatlantic relations, upholding a tough stance and sanctions against Russia, and pursuing an ever-closer European Union. The only major issue that sparks more intense debate is Germany’s policy toward China. In contrast to this consensus, the AfD initially entered the political scene as an anti-Euro and later anti-migration party. Now, after becoming increasingly radical, they hold seats in most German state parliaments and seem poised to remain a fixture in the political landscape. Similarly, the BSW seeks to leverage the Ukraine war to secure a lasting place in German politics. To understand the extent of the AfD and BSW’s divergence from the traditional parties, it is important to first of all understand the policy stances of Germany’s mainstream parties before moving to those of the two newcomers.
East v. West - Germany's Internal Divide
The upcoming three state elections might turn out to be shocking to the neutral observer. It's crucial to highlight the distinct political traditions within the country. The results of these state elections are likely to have limited predictive value for the general election next year. Both the AfD and the BSW enjoy considerably more support in the east than in the Rhineland or the southern regions of Germany. This discrepancy is often attributed to the lingering impact of the socialist dictatorship in the GDR during the 20th century on the region's political culture, as well as the perceived lack of economic convergence in the 35 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, a deeper look into history reveals that Germany has always been politically diverse. This diversity is significant, as various predecessor states existed well into the 19th century, and current state borders often still align with those historical state boundaries. For instance, Prussia, the dominant state in eastern Germany, had foreign policy objectives that were fundamentally different from those of the Rhineland states, largely due to geographic positioning (proximity to the Russian Tsardom versus proximity to Western Europe), economic orientation (Prussia remained an agrarian state for a long time, while the states along the Rhine relied on their burgeoning industries), and of course, their distinct histories, cultures, and institutions (Prussia was famously described as an army with a state, and it was Protestant, while many other German states were Roman Catholic). These differences have at times played important roles in the past, for example in the general elections of the 1930s.
Nevertheless, these upcoming state elections will serve as a "Gradmesser", or barometer, for the ruling parties of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP. Results that are even worse than expected could increase the pressure on the government. For the SPD in particular, much is at stake as they are part of the governing coalitions in all three states. Additionally, these elections will mark the first significant test for the BSW, which so far has only participated in the European elections. As of this writing, the AfD leads the polls in each state, with the BSW also showing strong support, ranging from 15% to 20%, as shown in the table below. Even if these radical, new parties do not manage to join government coalitions, their success could push other centrist parties to shift their policy positions in the run-up to the general election. While the state elections, particularly in Thuringia and Saxony, will be noteworthy on their own, this text will primarily focus on the federal level when examining the positions of the various parties and their leading politicians.
Polling results for the Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia state elections and for the next federal election, carried out by INSA (on August 6, 16, 13 and 13 respectively)
The CDU - Business as Usual
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) could very well be the party of Germany’s next chancellor. Their foreign policy stance appears to be a continuation of past policies, but their approach towards ideological rivals has shifted significantly from just a few years ago. Officially, it is no longer the party of "Wandel durch Handel" - change through trade - but it's not entirely clear what kind of party they are becoming.
The CDU takes a firm stance against Russia, condemning its actions in Ukraine and advocating for war crimes prosecutions. They want Germany to play a key role in supporting Ukraine's reconstruction and have proposed using Russian assets to help cover these costs. The CDU also pushes for both a deeper and broader European Union. In military matters, the party advocates for closer cooperation among EU and NATO member states. This includes ideas like creating a common European internal market for arms production, joint military equipment development, and reforming the EU's decision-making process to allow a qualified majority to expedite decisions on Common Security and Foreign Policy.
Moreover, the party faces a particularly complex challenge in balancing its approach to the US and China. Officially, the party seeks to maintain a close partnership with the US while promoting a rules-based order in its dealings with China. To counter China's growing influence, they support strategic "derisking" rather than decoupling. This involves backing initiatives like the Global Gateway and strengthening economic and trade partnerships with the Global South. Germany’s industry is in many aspects still heavily reliant on the Chinese market and Chinese suppliers. The CDU thus favours a common European derisking strategy, coordinated with the US but leaving space for partnerships with China.
The CDU's foreign policy reflects a commitment to multilateralism, strong transatlantic ties, and a militarily stronger EU. While the party has taken a clear stance against Russian aggression, it struggles to present a detailed plan for engagement with China. The upcoming US election adds another layer of uncertainty. Some within the CDU, such as Jens Spahn - a former minister, future hopeful of the CDU and visitor to the 2024 Republican National Convention - are suggesting that Germany and the EU should begin talks with Donald Trump now, in case he will be re-elected, to ensure inclusion in any peace negotiations Trump might initiate with Russia. This suggestion underscores the christian democrats long standing transatlantic ties, but it also highlights a potential dilemma: whether to align with Trump’s agenda or risk damaging its relationship with the US. The party’s stance on critical issues like Ukraine and China may evolve significantly depending on the outcome of the US election.
The SPD - The Chancellor's Party
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, is deeply intertwined with the concepts of "Zeitenwende" (a historic turning point) and "Sondervermögen" (a special fund for military spending). Their foreign policy program offers few surprises, aligning closely with consensus stances. The SPD emphasises the protection and expansion of the European peace project through increased military strength and a more prominent role within NATO. With the Sondervermögen, the SPD has committed Germany to sustained military spending of at least two percent of GDP. Under their leadership, Germany has also released its first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS), although this document has faced criticism for not fully living up to the expectations set by the preceding rhetoric. It does not show a path for military spending post-Sondervermögen nor does it establish permanent institutional changes such as a national security council, at times leaving a question mark behind Zeitenwende.
Nevertheless, the SPD-led government in terms of arms deliveries and financial aid has been one of Ukraine's most important European allies, marking a significant shift from their previous stance toward Russia. For a long time, the SPD has favoured strong ties with Russia, including famously the Nord Stream pipelines. Multiple senior politicians have by now publicly apologised for past mistakes, including German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, although others, like former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who served as Chairman of the Board for Rosneft, have not followed suit. The SPD is part of all the governments of the states holding elections this fall. This realignment could cost the SPD votes in the russophile regions of eastern Germany in the upcoming elections, and it remains to be seen whether the party will maintain its current stance post-election.
Like the CDU, the SPD is both pro-enlargement and pro-deepening of the European Union. They advocate for the accelerated admission of Western Balkan states, as well as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The SPD envisions a European army, with the European Parliament playing a role in security and defence policy, a strengthened EU foreign policy office, and an independent Council of Defense Ministers. They also propose a common European arms export policy, which would entail surrendering certain national powers to supranational institutions – a critical idea opposed by the main opposition parties, as will be discussed later.
Regarding China, the SPD positions itself as a voice of moderation. Some within the party hope to create a wedge between China and Russia, and China’s statement against the use of nuclear threats by Russia, following Scholz’s visit in late 2022, is seen as a significant foreign policy achievement. The SPD advocates for de-risking the German economy from China, though this has not been consistently reflected in their policy actions. For example, the SPD supported Chinese investments in Germany’s main port despite warnings from coalition partners about increasing Chinese influence over German critical infrastructure. Additionally, the SPD remains cautious in implementing stringent rules for screening companies’ investments into China, often standing in contrast not only to their domestic partners but also to some G7 allies - a stance reminiscent of their previous Russia policy, which has since been reassessed.
The Greens - Germany's Westernmost Party
Far from their roots as a hippie party, the Green Party of Germany (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) now harbours ambitions of reaching the chancellery and becoming a true "Volkspartei," appealing to voters from all parts of society. However, both goals remain elusive. The Greens' stronghold lies in western Germany and the larger cities, while more rural areas, particularly in the east, remain a significant electoral challenge. This may be either due to their hipster-left image or their program's pronounced Western orientation or both.
In many respects, the Greens align with the CDU and SPD. They govern in coalition with both at the state level and will likely be considered a potential coalition partner by both after the next general election. However, even under the current leadership of the "Realos" (the pragmatic wing of the party), the Greens' approach to politics appears at times more focused on principles than pragmatic outcomes. Critics argue that this ideological bent could harm the German economy and Germany’s standing in the world.
Yet, the party, led by Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, has moved far from its pacifist origins. It is now a staunch supporter of Ukraine and consistently advocates for tougher stances against systemic adversaries like Russia and China. On the spectrum of toughness toward these nations, the Greens position themselves closest to the United States, adopting a more antagonistic stance than both the CDU and SPD. This has led to tensions within the government, such as when the SPD’s business wing publicly cautioned Baerbock that "Isolation should not be a maxim of Zeitenwende". While the Greens stop short of advocating for outright isolation, they have consistently taken a more hawkish position on issues like the role of Chinese companies in Germany’s critical infrastructure or German investments in China. They demand strict social, minority, and environmental protection standards in dealings with China and support the use of targeted sanctions in response to human rights abuses. By advocating for arms deliveries, they may have left the German pacifist vote unrepresented.
The Greens also push for significant reforms in European foreign policy, advocating for the transformation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy into a European foreign ministry. They support EU enlargement, backing the accession of Western Balkan states, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. In terms of European security and defence, the Greens propose common framework standards for armed forces, increased funding and personnel for both civilian and military missions, and the establishment of a common European arms market.
Their approach to conflict prevention is rooted in multilateralism and relies heavily on U.S.-led institutions. This internationalist stance resonates well with their base of western, highly educated voters. However, for a significant portion of the electorate that does not share this profile - particularly supporters of the AfD and BSW - the Greens are viewed as the primary political enemies. Critics accuse them of being responsible for Germany’s current economic woes and pursuing unrealistic foreign policy goals that could weaken the country's global standing. Although it may seem implausible to pin Germany’s deep-rooted issues on a party that was out of power from 2005 until the last election, this narrative has gained traction among many voters.
While there exist considerable disagreements in priorities and approaches between the CDU, SPD, and Greens, all three parties generally work toward a similar strategic direction. For decades, these parties, along with the smaller, market-liberal FDP, have shaped German policy through various coalitions. This long standing consensus is now under threat. Two newer parties, both formed within the last decade, are promising a clear departure from the traditional strategic vision, particularly regarding alignment with the U.S. and support for the EU
AfD - A (Radical) Alternative for Germany
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a party notorious for its hardline stance on immigration, advocating for re-immigration and stricter asylum policies in ways that are often viewed as radical and xenophobic. Key figures like neo-Nazi Björn Höcke, associated with the now-dissolved hard-right group "Der Flügel," underscore the party's radical elements, which have drawn the attention of domestic security agencies for potential right-wing extremism. Interestingly, Höcke is the AfD's lead candidate in the upcoming state election in Thuringia. A significant victory could enable him to push the party's already hard-right platform further into extremism as the 2025 general election approaches.
The AfD opposes EU sanctions that they believe harm Germany, advocating for the removal of all sanctions on Russia and Syria and opposing any sanctions on China. The party claims it would resolve the conflict in Ukraine through diplomacy and aims to restore German-Russian relations. Given that leading AfD politicians frequently appear on Russian television, this diplomatic "solution" could potentially involve exerting pressure on Ukraine to concede. The AfD also supports a trade partnership with China and advocates for Germany's participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative.
This alignment with Russia and China is particularly striking for a party that brands itself as nationalistic. It stands in stark contrast to the strategic visions of most other German parties. As the party evolved over the last decade, it shed top staff like snakeskin. As more balanced figures left the party, the party’s power centre shifted towards the east while the program and public appearance have grown increasingly extreme. Except for the Euro-scepticism, there is not much left of the Euro-sceptic party that was founded in a rich suburb of Frankfurt. Today, the AfD serves as a primary outlet for voters dissatisfied with the political status quo, a magnet for individuals ranging from the far-right wing of the CDU to the neo-Nazi NPD as well as a basin for aristocrats and imperial nostalgists.
The AfD's affinity for Russia and China may have contributed to its underperformance in the recent European elections, where it still managed to secure second place with nearly 16% of the vote. Even aside from the frequent neo-Nazi discussions, their campaign was marred by controversies. The party's vice leading candidate, Petr Bystron, came under intense scrutiny for allegedly receiving money from dubious sources and for granting access to the German parliament to a Russian agent. The leading candidate, Maximilian Krah, faces similar allegations, with a close employee accused of accepting money from Chinese sources, leading to a police raid on Krah’s Brussels offices. Both investigations were publicised in the final phase of the election campaign. Yet, the vote effect of these revelations will probably not carry over to the state elections and might be forgotten by the time the general election comes around next year.
Regarding the EU, the AfD advocates a minimalist approach. From its inception, the AfD has been critical of the EU, viewing it as undemocratic and calling for stronger national sovereignty, even questioning the Schengen agreements. The party rejects the formal common EU foreign and security policy supported by the mainstream parties, favouring instead a looser model of intergovernmental coordination. While the AfD acknowledges the importance of economic and technological cooperation with the United States, it also emphasises divergent geopolitical interests, particularly in energy matters. The AfD supports European strategic autonomy through a unified defence community but primarily focuses on strengthening the German national army and the domestic weapons industry. The party also promotes the German language in neighbouring countries and criticises what it describes as a "post-colonial guilt culture." For example, it condemns Poland's decision to reduce German language lessons. In light of recent revisionist actions by Russia based on language groups and revisionist intentions in other countries, such as Hungary, which are often also based on language identity, this point, though not central to the program, might have implications for how the AfD would want to pursue German foreign policy goals with their neighbours.
The AfD is expected to perform strongly in the upcoming state elections, potentially winning all of them.
The BSW - The Peace Party?
Union Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) is a newcomer to the German political scene, predicted to make a significant impact in East Germany. Founded by the hard-left politician Sahra Wagenknecht, the party seeks to recalibrate the political left in Germany with a focus on workers' issues. While her former party, Die Linke, faces the possibility of failing to pass the electoral threshold in two of the three upcoming state elections and might fade into obscurity by 2025, BSW is poised for a strong national electoral debut. The BSW platform combines traditional left-wing social and industrial policies with an anti-immigration stance and a radically different foreign policy approach.
From BSW's perspective, Germany, as an export-oriented and resource-poor nation, requires a foreign economic policy centred on stable trade relationships with a diverse range of partners, rather than the formation of new blocs and the imposition of extensive sanctions. Their platform contrasts the negative impact of sanctions on Russia with economic success, advocating for the loosening of these sanctions and the reopening of pipelines. They argue that rising energy costs due to the ongoing conflict threaten Germany's industrial base and could lead to the loss of well-paid jobs. This economic argument resonates particularly in the states of the former GDR. To end Russian aggression in Ukraine, they propose initiating peace negotiations and linking financial support for Ukraine to its willingness to engage in these talks, alongside an immediate halt to all arms exports to the country.
Sahra Wagenknecht herself is a credible figure for advocating new relationships with Russia. Born in East Germany and a former member of the SED, the dictatorial ruling party of the GDR, Wagenknecht has built her political career on GDR nostalgia and affinity for the former Eastern Bloc. After the reunification, she became a leading figure in the "Kommunistische Plattform" (Communist Platform), a left-extremist faction within Die Linke and its predecessor parties. Despite her radical views, Wagenknecht remains a popular guest on talk shows. Her political approach often led to tensions within Die Linke, culminating in her departure from the party, along with her supporters, in early 2024. She has gained attention by organising “Peace Demonstrations”, events that have attracted a diverse mix of traditional left pacifists, workers, feminists (with feminist icon Alice Schwarzer being a major supporter), as well as AfD members and conspiracy theorists.
Regarding the balance of American and Chinese interests, BSW is more critical of the United States than any other party in Germany. They target dominant US corporations like BlackRock, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft, and Apple, accusing them of undermining competition and democracy. This stance implies a push for stricter regulations against these companies, which could lead to tensions with the US. BSW advocates for the EU to stay out of the conflict between the USA and China, instead promoting what they term diverse trade and energy partnerships. They also call for the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from EU member states and the dismantling of EU military structures like PESCO and the European Defense Fund, proposing that the resources freed up be redirected towards civil conflict resolution efforts.
On EU enlargement and international trade, BSW calls for a moratorium on EU expansion and opposes accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The party’s EU program underscores that in a world fraught with violence and potential new bloc confrontations, Europe could suffer due to its geographical position and dependence on resources, energy carriers, and export markets. This leitmotif recurs throughout their platform. While they support EU integration primarily as a peace project, they oppose centralising power in Brussels. However, they do advocate for a unified stance against American and Chinese internet giants and push for the reindustrialization of the EU. BSW seeks to detach from the US-led Western order, advocating for a balanced approach in relations between the US and China.
BSW’s foreign policy diverges sharply from traditional social democratic stances, prioritising economic stability and peace initiatives over military alliances and sanctions. They view Russia as a crucial energy provider rather than a threat and advocate for detaching Germany from US influence in trade and foreign policy. Instead, BSW calls for a focus on economic success and cooperation with a broad range of international partners, even if that means abandoning former partners like Ukraine. They oppose further EU enlargement and integration, viewing these through the lens of spheres of influence. BSW is particularly wary of provoking Russia by strengthening EU institutions.
Wagenknecht’s positions have found support in the Bundestag from the AfD, raising questions about whether BSW might be open to forming a coalition with them. If this were to happen, Germany could see its first BSW/AfD state government as soon as this fall. The implications of such a coalition for Germany's political culture and foreign policy strategy are difficult to predict. Unlike with the Greens and the AfD when they first emerged, other major parties have not yet turned hostile against BSW. However, this might change as the election campaign intensifies. It is striking how significant portions of the German electorate appear willing to overlook Russia’s actions in exchange for cheaper energy. This could make it challenging for mainstream parties to maintain their hawkish positions.
A Zeiteinwende in the German Political Landscape?
On central foreign policy issues, Germany's political landscape is now divided into two blocs. Even before 2022, the AfD opposed many established orthodoxies, such as deeper EU integration and a close partnership with the US, but they never garnered enough support to significantly influence policy. Since Russia's attack on Ukraine, new divisions have emerged. The sanctions regime has impacted Germany's energy-intensive industries and left a deep impression on the public psyche. Now, EU-sceptic, pro-Russian, and anti-American parties could potentially secure more than a third of the seats in the next general election.
With the entry of BSW into the political arena, the AfD may have found a new path to power beyond the unlikely scenario of the CDU allowing them to become a junior coalition partner. The upcoming state elections in the east have the potential to shake the foundations of the German political system, putting parties in the limelight whose radicalness cannot be understated.
Bibliography
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Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands & Christlich-Soziale Union (2024). Europawahlprogramm CDU/CSU 2024.
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2024). Europawahlprogramm 2024.
Standish, R (2023, July 12). Toward a more strategic German foreign policy. Council on Foreign Relations.
Federal Government of Germany (2023). National Security Strategy.
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (2024). Europawahlprogramm 2024.
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (2024). Parteiprogramm.
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