Europe: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
- Tiziano Romano
- 3 days ago
- 12 min read
Perspectives on the Twilight of Atlantic Solidarity and Europe’s Future
For the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crumpling of the bipolar world, we are witnessing a seismic geopolitical shift. Three years ago, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, ending a seemingly rare period of peace in Europe. Today, following the election of Donald Trump to the United States Presidency, the transatlantic alliance seems to be in doubt. Europe has been abruptly reminded that History continues with its relentless flow.
Through all this chaotic change, it is important to bring some clarity to our understanding of the situation. The main thrust of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, which is now endorsed by Republican leadership and much of the Pentagon and CIA, is first and foremost aimed at reinforcing America’s position against China. As opposed to 2017, when Trump was seen by both his own party and the bureaucratic apparatus of the United States as a complete outsider, he now yields a far deeper level of control over the Republican Party. As a result, his current administration is composed of individuals chosen primarily for their loyalty to the President, rather than as a product of compromises between the various factions within the Party.
In recent years, there has been a fundamental shift in the geopolitical outlook of both the Democratic and Republican parties regarding China. In 2017, many in Washington still viewed Russia as the primary adversary, particularly in the wake of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. At the time, China’s rise was largely framed as an economic challenge rather than an existential security threat. However, throughout Trump’s first administration as well as Biden’s presidency, China’s military expansion, its increasingly aggressive stance on Taiwan, its support for Russia, and its use of economic coercion have reshaped the strategic consensus in Washington. Policymakers across the political spectrum have come to recognize that China, not Russia, represents the true long-term threat to U.S. global primacy.
This growing bipartisan hostility toward China has manifested in concrete policy actions over the years, including tariffs and export bans on Chinese technology, severe restrictions on U.S. investments in China, and the dominance of anti-China rhetoric across both Republican and Democratic platforms. This has reinforced Trump’s strategic vision, making his approach—which once faced strong resistance—now far more aligned with the evolving priorities of the U.S. political and security establishment.
An argument could be made that the strategy pursued until now, particularly by the Democrats, to counter the rise of a threatening Eurasian axis challenging American security and interests has relied on maintaining stable relations with China while weakening its smaller partners — Russia, Iran, and North Korea — who were seen by Washington as the most revisionist and prone to destabilizing actions. Trump’s approach appears to be the exact opposite: he seeks to dismantle the dangerous Eurasian axis by confronting China directly and aggressively while improving U.S. relations with Moscow as much as possible.
The surprising and somewhat perplexing stance taken by the U.S. administration in its current dealings concerning the Ukraine-Russia conflict could be better understood if interpreted as an attempt to pull Russia out of China’s sphere of influence. This approach is driven not only by strategic geopolitical considerations but also by the ideological similarities between Trumpism and Putin’s regime. Both share a nationalist, anti-globalist vision, a preference for strongman leadership, and a skepticism toward multilateral institutions.This stance pursues a dual objective: on one hand, isolating Beijing and weakening its position in future negotiations; on the other, strengthening the United States’ global standing through a firm policy towards China, coupled with a more accommodating attitude towards Russia. This also serves as preparation for critical scenarios, such as a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which would lead to obvious political and economic issues within the United States. China is already under pressure from economic and trade difficulties and has committed to power projection at the wrong time as expendable systems, such as drones and missiles are becoming increasingly effective and their relatively low cost makes them much more useful when compared to a large blue-water navy and overseas bases. These systems can blunt the effectiveness of the large and expensive platforms, such as aircraft carriers, integral to power projection. Shifts in the conduct of war threaten to make power projection more difficult to achieve. Warfare is changing as governments prioritize the deployment of these cheaper weapons at scale.
Moscow also benefits from the reconciliation with Washington. There is an opportunity for Russia to escape the mortal hug of Beijing with whom it has in the medium-term opposite strategic interests, for instance regarding Siberia. For Russia as well, a long-standing geopolitical principle applies: it is often safer to align with a distant power rather than one that shares a significant border with you.
In Trump's vision, the United States should seize this opportunity to pressure China into negotiating a “Great Bargain” from a position of weakness — one that redefines the commercial relationship between the two nations in favour of the U.S., promotes disarmament, and prevents military conflict.
Against this backdrop, the current U.S. administration regards Europe as irrelevant, deeming it incapable of influencing global power balances and thus a secondary ally in the larger contest against Beijing. American interests are now prioritized over Atlantic solidarity, with Europe increasingly seen as a burden rather than a strategic asset.
Added to this, there is an ideological and political factor: a clear desire for revenge against Europe’s liberal elites — former allies of Biden — which translates into an intent to humiliate European leaders and destabilize the continent by fostering nationalist and populist movements. This is evident in the way recent U.S. manoeuvres toward Russia were more overt, as opposed to how they were conducted in the past. Washington could have at least maintained the appearance of transatlantic cohesion, granting Europe a nominal role in the negotiations; instead, the new administration seems determined to openly sideline Europe, discrediting, humiliating, and punishing it.
Europe, in turn, is already profoundly divided and struggles to respond. On one side, countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria maintain a stance more sympathetic to Russia, driven by economic and energy considerations rather than geopolitical fears. On the other side, Germany and Italy continue to pay a high price for the breakdown in relations with Moscow, particularly due to their previous heavy dependence on Russian energy. Germany was especially impacted by the sabotage of Nord Stream 2 in 2022, which not only marked the symbolic end of its gas partnership with Russia but also worsened domestic inflation and industrial uncertainty. While there were early efforts to keep diplomatic lines open, these were soon overshadowed by Germany’s growing alignment with NATO and U.S. strategic priorities.
In Italy, the government has remained officially committed to supporting Ukraine, but internal political tensions suggest a more complex reality. This was evident in Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s leaked 2023 phone call with Russian pranksters, where she acknowledged growing “fatigue” in Europe over the continuation of the war—a rare admission that cast light on potential doubts within the ruling coalition. Within that coalition, the Lega party, long known for its sympathetic stance toward Moscow, has called for renewed dialogue and an end to arms shipments, aligning with its nationalist and sovereigntist platform. Even within the opposition, the 5 Star Movement has consistently expressed pacifist views and criticized ongoing military support to Ukraine, underscoring how a significant portion of Italy’s political spectrum remains open to reassessing the current confrontational approach toward Russia.
Moreover, at a time when the traditional Euro-Atlantic partnership is under mounting strain and views between the United States and Europe—especially concerning the future of the Ukraine-Russia conflict—are increasingly diverging, both Germany and Italy risk lapsing into strategic inertia. Shaped by their postwar histories and the enduring presence of American military forces on their soil, they tend to follow Washington’s lead almost by default, even when such alignment runs counter to broader European interests and threatens the cohesion of the EU itself.
Meanwhile, the strenuously anti-Russian nations of Eastern Europe, now deprived of traditional American support, are looking toward France and the United Kingdom. Paris and London, both strong adversaries of Trump, are positioning themselves as leaders of a more assertive Europe, seeking both to reinforce the European Union under French leadership and to consolidate their own roles on the continent by fostering a rapprochement between the UK and the EU. However, European diplomacy—both at the national level and, even more challenging, at the EU level—has historically proven weak without American backing. The failure to both enforce the Minsk Agreement at first and then to secure a peace agreement in Ukraine before the current disaster is a stark demonstration of this weakness.
One of the thorniest issues lies in the fact that the European integration process itself was a result of an American impetus and developed within the limits set by Washington’s strategic interests. During the Cold War, U.S. policy aimed to create a united and resilient Western Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It is not a coincidence that Marshall Plan aid was conditioned on the establishment of the first European organization, the OEEC, and that the U.S. later provided strong diplomatic backing for the creation of the ECSC and further European integration. This was a way to interlink European nations’ interests, fostering stability and cooperation, but also was a means of reassuring the continent and facilitating the rearmament of West Germany, culminating in its NATO membership in 1955.The real question now is what Europe, and the EU, can be without American support or engagement. The United States complains about European inertia and weakness, yet it has been the primary architect of Europe’s transformation into precisely this state — just as always happens to the provinces of an empire. In some ways, America’s reproaches toward the EU recall Gorbachev’s criticisms of the Warsaw Pact leadership — an approach that Moscow itself had encouraged and imposed. In Gorbachev’s case, his destabilization of the system ultimately led to its collapse — a policy that resulted in an unintended and ironic reversal of its goals.
Trump is betting on Europe’s inability to react, wagering on a continent already considered dead and seeking to fragment it further through bilateral diplomacy. If Trump were to decide to sacrifice Europe, abandoning it to its own fate while forging a closer alliance with Russia to strengthen America’s position against China, this would undoubtedly pose existential threats to European nations—first in the East, but eventually in the West as well. Throughout history, small, defenceless, yet wealthy and divided states have always been coveted by imperial powers. The fate of Renaissance Italy in the 16th century offers a striking historical parallel.
A divided Europe, encircled by empires and lacking an efficient political-military structure, would not only face potential military threats—though these seem distant, at least to the west—but would also be increasingly unable to defend its democratic institutions and economic interests in the international arena. In the current phase, European nations cannot afford to display weakness or submissiveness, as such signals would only reinforce Washington’s and Moscow’s existing perceptions of the continent.
What Can Europe Do to React?
Given the dramatically challenging situation, one might speculate that, as has happened at other key moments in history, the acute crisis Europe is now facing could serve as a catalyst for its awakening and resurgence. The European Rearmament Plan, recently presented by the European Commission, represents an important first step toward addressing the continent's growing security concerns. In addition to this, initiatives taken by key European powers such as France and the United Kingdom to seek European-driven solutions highlight the urgency of building a more independent defence posture, especially in response to America’s potential disengagement from Ukraine and the possibility of a broader withdrawal of U.S. security commitments from Europe in the future.
However, despite these early efforts, the steps taken thus far remain cautious and far from transformative. The question now is whether Europe can overcome internal divisions and act swiftly enough to ensure its security and autonomy in the face of mounting global challenges.
At the heart of this shift lies the need for deeper military integration, a process that faces several challenges and limitations. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which aims to coordinate military and defence efforts across the EU, has long been stymied by the division of priorities between member states. The creation of a unified European army, while long discussed, faces significant obstacles in terms of command structures, budget allocations, and political will, especially in light of diverging national interests and military priorities.
One of the major points of contention within any move toward European military integration is the issue of command and control. The integration of national military forces under a centralized European command structure is deeply controversial, as many member states, particularly those with powerful military forces like France and Germany, would be reluctant to cede sovereignty over their defence policies. Furthermore, the question of whether such a force could operate independently of NATO, in which the U.S. plays a central role, remains unresolved. Even with the increasing European desire for autonomy, the role of the U.S. in European security remains a sensitive issue, especially with regard to nuclear deterrence.
One potential solution to this dilemma could be the extension of France’s Force de Frappe as a key component of European defence. France’s nuclear arsenal, which has traditionally been seen as a national asset, could be integrated into a broader and extended European strategy, offering an important deterrent while simultaneously reducing Europe’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This move, however, would require significant political consensus, as some countries may be wary of nuclear proliferation or reluctant to link their security to France’s nuclear posture.
Furthermore, the issue of financing — particularly the question of common defence spending — remains one of the most divisive issues in European defence integration. While some countries advocate for a common European defence budget to pool resources and ensure solidarity, others, the most frugal ones, are reluctant. The challenge of common debt for common defence is complicated by varying levels of defence spending among member states, as well as political hesitations regarding the transfer of national sovereignty over defence budgets. This division highlights the difficulty of creating a truly integrated European defence system, where the economic cost is shared equally across nations.
Moreover, if Europe aims to defend the values of democracy, liberalism, and the welfare state, while simultaneously becoming more assertive politically and militarily, it must also secure strong internal social consensus for these transformations. This requires not only structural reforms but also a cultural and informational battle to counter Russian and American influence and strengthen European identity among its citizens.
Beyond propaganda and strategic communication, public perception is key. European populations must not see security efforts as being financed at the expense of the lower and middle classes. If the costs of rearmament disproportionately affect these groups, social unrest and populist movements could rise, undermining the very strategic decisions Europe needs to make. A broad social effort is essential to maintaining economic and social stability, which is critical in an increasingly turbulent geopolitical landscape. Regarding the financing of the RearmEU plan for instance, several strategies must be considered. One of the most promising, as suggested by former Italian Prime Minister and ECB President Mario Draghi, is the unification of European capital markets to mobilize large-scale private financing. However, to ensure fairness and justice within the Union, such a move would necessitate deeper fiscal harmonization and greater European solidarity beyond just the defence sector.
In the current situation, it is crucial for the two most important countries in the EU — Germany and France — to demonstrate their leadership by cooperating on a farsighted and ambitious plan. To achieve this, both must be willing to make reciprocal concessions, setting aside some national interests in order to pursue a greater collective goal. Germany should be ready to adopt a more generous stance on the common defence debt in exchange for France’s commitment to extending its nuclear deterrence and agreeing to a shared strategic command structure that reflects European, not just French, interests. In this delicate balance, countries like Italy could play a pivotal role as mediators, facilitating dialogue between the two sides to forge a compromise that places the collective European interests at the forefront.
Beyond this, Europe should also seize this opportunity to accelerate the federalization process, at least among its principal nations. A “two-speed Europe” could emerge, in which the most determined states reinforce European unity, establishing more fluid and effective structures capable of addressing global challenges with a single, strong, and clear voice. Such a project would undoubtedly be risky and would need to be pursued with caution. However, it could also compel Europe’s conservative and nationalist factions that wink at Trump to make a definitive choice: either participate in the construction of a stronger, more independent Europe, or remain on the sidelines as mere vassals of the American administration.
One way or another, interesting times lie ahead.
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