Daniel in the Lions' Den

How France survived the Napoleonic Wars

Almost as much ink has been spent on writing about the Congress of Vienna and its outcomes as has blood been shed on the battlefields across Europe in the wars prior. It is by no means a novel topic but there always seems to be a new way to look at the monumental diplomatic victory. A major geopolitical angle was explored in A World Restored (Kissinger, 1957), society and nationalism was discussed in The Age of Revolution (Hobsbawm, 1962) and many biographies have described the personalities of the time, including Talleyrand: le prince immobile (De Waresquiel, 2006). What makes this Congress so important is the fact that it created (or at least cemented) the modern multilateral diplomatic tradition with an emphasis on common security and peace between great powers. In effect, the Congress was oriented towards peace; before consoling the victors, before punishing the loser, and before any idea of European domination. That is not to say it was easy: the Russian Tsar showed himself very fickle and power-hungry and the Prussian plenipotentiaries were not averse to ideas of expansion. Most of the Congress’ energy was spent on the division of Poland between Prussia and Russia, and the question of the freedom of Saxony – with one curious omission: France. France, the instigator and final loser of two decades of War was almost miraculously left as it started. How and why did a France that marched from Lisbon to Moscow, which founded kingdoms and destroyed an empire, manage to survive the biggest great power conflict yet fought?

Talleyrand’s expert diplomacy and the principle of ‘Legitimacy’

France exited the Napoleonic wars ravaged, occupied and under threat of dismantlement. Europe, much like France, was in a similar state. A scorched-earth tactic was used by the Russians in their own land. The Holy Roman Empire was dismantled by its own emperor. Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony were elevated to the rank of Kingdoms, but in their own ways were severely affected by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. What the great geopolitical figures of the time wanted once France was defeated was a long-lasting peace between great powers. In the words of the preamble of the original treaty signed in Paris the 30th of May 1814, “His Majesty the Emperor of Austria […] and his allies, not wanting to demand any more from France, having placed itself once again under her paternal government of her kings [such that she] offers Europe a pledge of security and stability, under conditions and guaranties that were regretfully asked of her under her last government, their [collective] Majesties have appointed plenipotentiaries to discuss, decide on and sign a treaty of peace and friendship.” It is strikingly evident that to Klemens von Metternich (the Austrian foreign minister and orchestrator of a large portion of the treaty), and to all allied great powers, France was a vital party in securing a stable ‘equilibrium’ of powers. This was the ultimate goal of the upcoming Congress, pushed particularly by Metternich and his British counterpart, the Viscount of Castlereagh.

The main post-war aim for France was by and large the securing of their position and the maximisation of their role on the European stage. The question of France was dealt with at the original Paris peace treaty, with a punitive loss of land only after the infamous ‘100 days’, which happened during the Congress’ development. At the point of the treaty in 1814, the rationale was, according to De Waresquiel, “Old dynasty, old borders,”, and so France was given her old borders: Article 2 of the treaty states that “The Kingdom of France conserves the entirety of her limits, as they existed on the 1st of January 1792.” From there, the Rhine would become free for commerce (Article 5), the return of certain colonies to France was established (Article 14), transitionary clauses were drawn up in a secret article with Russia concerning the ill-fated Duchy of Warsaw, and the abolition of slavery was considered in an article with the United Kingdom.

Figure 1: Map of Europe in 1792. Notice France’s position on the Rhine, the Austrian control of the southern Netherlands and Poland’s independence which would become a contentious issue during the Congress. Notice also the existence of the Holy Roman Empire: no effort was made by the Habsburg family, Metternich or the German princes to reestablish it during the Congress.

At the Congress mandated by the 32nd Article of the peace agreement, France was given a seat among the great powers to decide the future of Europe. The problem of enforcement remained: having close to no military strength, the French plenipotentiaries, and above all, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the ambassador to the Congress, were weak in the face of their former enemies. “A close friend of Metternich compares the French plenipotentiaries in Vienna to dogs that bark but will not bite […]. Talleyrand has no intention of making war, but he acts as if he does not rule out the possibility.” (De Waresquiel, 2006, p. 484). France’s diplomats, knowing her weakness militarily, elected to follow the example of her King, and ground themselves upon a moral basis; all of Talleyrand’s diplomatic strategy, from the Kingdom of Naples to the Kingdom of Saxony would base itself around ‘legitimacy’. “This principle of legitimacy seems to have inspired all of the views of the King; it is however remarkable that this principle held more sway in his mind when it suited his personal sympathies.” (Madelin, 1944, p. 321). The principle of ‘legitimacy’ is the idea that states, kings and emperors should only own and control what they ought to own and control. Still, the French king specifically and the diplomats in general, applied this principle when it suited them most.

France had four broad objectives, “Restoring France to the first rank of powers, preserving her frontiers, restoring the Neapolitan Bourbons and protecting the King of Saxony.” (Jarrett, 2014, p. 154). The protection of the Bourbon family was the main preoccupation of the King of France. King Louis XVIII, was, of course, the head of the House of Bourbon, and wanted to cement his family back into the fibre of European statecraft. On top of this, one of Napoleon’s most important generals was in control of Naples, long after the emperor’s exile. The snuffing out of Bonapartism and any revolutionary byproducts was a high priority of the conservative King, although he was constrained by the Constitutional Charter that attempted to reconcile the novelties of the revolution with the return of the Ancien Régime: “The constitution, which was intended to pave the way for the restoration of the monarchy, served essentially to prevent a simultaneous restoration of the institutions of the Ancien Régime.” (Sellin, n.d., p. 27). Peace is of primary importance, according to the preamble of the Charter of 1814, both within the country and between the great powers: “Peace was the primary need of our subjects, we occupied ourselves without end; and this peace so necessary to France like the rest of Europe, is signed. […] The wish so dear to our heart, is that all the French live as brothers, and that a bitter memory could never trouble this solemn act.” 

Similarly, Article 71 lays out the reconciliation of Ancien Régime nobility and Napoleonic nobility: “The old nobility takes back its titles. The new nobility conserves their own.” That same article lays out the revolutionary ideal of rights and duties of each citizen, while attempting to reconcile them with a much older notion of nobility: “The King makes nobles at will, but only accords them ranks and titles, without exception to the responsibilities and duties of society.” The Constitutional Charter was an astonishingly liberal prerequisite imposed by the conservative ‘allied powers’, but it was eventually hindered by two kings who wanted to retake absolute power in France through a relatively weak constitution that led to the 1830 revolution.

 Figure 2: A lithographic impression of the Constitutional Charter of 1814. An impressively balanced document, between revolutionary and conservative, but full of constitutional issues that would be exploited by both its subsequent rulers. Louis XVIII and Charles X would never give their liberal parliament a liberal prime minister, and Charles X abused article 14 four times, which stated, “The King is the supreme head of the state, [...] and makes the necessary regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the security of the state,” which would ultimately lead to the 1830 revolution.

While the restoration of the Bourbon family in Naples was highly important to the King, the protection of the King of Saxony and his territory was a necessary step for Talleyrand’s diplomatic plays and his idea of securing France’s position in the future. To Talleyrand, Germany had to be divided to protect French interests: “The conservation of a broken up, federated, and independent Germany between Prussia and Austria was a constant of his political ideas during the revolution.” (De Waresquiel, 2006, p. 467). The relative strength of the Kingdom of Saxony in its position between the two German great powers was thus an important topic to Talleyrand for the safeguard of France’s security issues. He famously said, “Prussia, master of Saxony, would become master of Germany.” It also allowed the French ambassador to impose the French principle of ‘legitimacy’ at the forefront of the Congress. Where Metternich proposed that Saxony could be integrated by Prussia in exchange for a free Poland, Talleyrand stood up for the weak Kingdom, citing the ‘illegitimate’ nature of the annexation. The Emperor of Austria later scolded his prime minister for using Saxony as a pawn, weakening Austria’s claim as the legitimate German great power. This ideology of legitimacy came back time and again: Talleyrand even scolded Tsar Alexander for his desire to annex Poland saying, “Your majesty will only want to keep what is legitimately yours.” (Madelin, 1944, p. 332).

Figure 3: Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord in 1808. Talleyrand was a true ‘survivor’ of the revolution. He participated in the revolution as a Bishop and co-authored the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and proposed the nationalisation of the church’s goods and properties, which ultimately led to his excommunication. He then resigned as bishop, escaped to London and then to various American cities during the Terror. He was fundamental in the rise of Napoleon, and fundamental in his downfall. He was important in the postwar interregnum government, and important in the Congress of Vienna under the restoration. Talleyrand always knew the way the wind was blowing and always somehow came off the better.

Talleyrand constructed an idea of a France that was the defender of the smaller countries, which concerned itself with the legitimacy of each action. “In a note to Metternich from the 19th of December 1814, Talleyrand […] declared that France had been less of an ‘instrument’ than a ‘victim’ of Napoleonic oppression, an unmistakable appeal to the solidarity of the counter-revolutionary powers.” (Sellin, n.d., p. 27). Talleyrand built up a divide between the ‘old’ France of the revolution, and the ‘new’ France of the restoration, which in itself was the France of the Ancien Régime of the Sun King. What France became in the eyes of the plenipotentiaries of the Congress was an allied nation in search of a stable equilibrium in Europe, ready to uphold the postwar status quo by force, with what little force France was still able to muster – a strategic reorganisation of the postwar consensus allowed France to be accepted more fully on the European stage. On the 3rd of January 1815, a secret alliance was formed between the United Kingdom, Austria and France, with the United Provinces, Bavaria and Hannover (through a personal union with the United Kingdom) later joining ranks. This alliance was both a strategic one for congressional procedures and a military one against a strong Russo-Prussian friendship. Talleyrand was very happy with the new alliance. He wrote to the King immediately saying, “Now, Sire, the coalition has been dissolved, and it will always be so. France is not only no longer isolated in Europe, but your Majesty already has a federated system that fifty years of negotiation could not have given you.”

Castlereagh’s and Metternich’s broader geopolitical strategy

France was without a doubt the focus of many British and Austrian containment efforts. Castlereagh and Metternich worked hard so that France would have to remain within its borders and could not expand like it once had across the continent. In these efforts, Castlereagh insisted that the Spanish should have a full restoration, that the United Provinces annex the then Austrian Netherlands (Modern day Belgium) and formed a bulwark against French expansionism up the coast of the English Channel, and that Italy should be strong against France. In all three, the Austro-British diplomacy prevailed, and was successful all the way into the Final Act of the Congress: “The line that will compose the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is determined in the following way: it starts from the sea, and extends itself all the long the French border on the side of the Netherlands as they were rectified and fixed by article 3 of the treaty of Paris, all the way to the Meuse.” and “His Majesty the King of Sardinia will add to his current titles that of the Duke of Genoa.” (Articles 66 and 87 respectively). Both the Kingdom of the Netherlands and what would become the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia were bolstered significantly to counter a historical tendency of French interference in both regions, and both regions were heavily incorporated into Napoleon’s continental system. “Piedmont surrendered part of Savoy to Geneva but was strengthened as ‘a buffer state’ on the borders of France by the acquisition of Genoa and Nice.” (Jarrett, 2014, p. 134). France was very obviously and understandably the subject of a lot of containment.

For counter-revolutionary and punitive reasons, Murat, Napoleon’s general who became King of Naples, was ousted by the Congress and the Neapolitan Bourbons were restored to the throne (Article 104 of the Final Act of the Congress). This of course pleased the French Bourbon King, but was also forced after Murat’s participation in the chaotic 100 days that followed Bonaparte’s escape from Elba. While Castlereagh wanted to limit British involvement on the continent and saw every battle fought on European soil as a British failure, Metternich was much more hands-on, willing to put down revolutionary revolts and uphold the new ‘Concert of Europe’ by force. Of course, the idea of a ‘concert’ is that all great powers would work in concert to uphold the status quo and avoid a great power conflict. It is in that vein that Murat was ousted, in favour of a more conservative and ‘acceptable’ ruler.

Figure 4: Klemens von Metternich in 1815. Metternich was the real star of the Congress and worked hard with Castlereagh to push a more systematic and Realist balance of powers during the deliberations of the Congress. The postwar consensus was authored by them both in large part. Metternich was later bogged down in subduing newly annexed north Italy, which bolstered the non-German population substantially, leading, in part, to Hungarian uprisings, the weakening of the Austrian Empire on the European stage, and both Italian and German unification. Castlereagh committed suicide not long after the Congress and was replaced by Canning, one of his long-time rivals, who was much less ready to uphold the European status quo. Metternich was distraught – he had lost his closest ideological ally.

The topic of the Rhineland is very important when it comes to French and Prussian geopolitics during the congressional period. Britain, France and Austria were unwilling to sacrifice Saxony to Prussia for a partially free Poland. The alternative offered by all three was the entirety of the Rhineland. This was chosen particularly because it was disconnected from the Prussian heartland, and for more strategic reasons for every state: the United Kingdom wanted to protect Hannover at all costs and “Castlereagh’s main concern was […] that a ‘weak prince’ in the Rhineland would quickly become an ‘instrument in the hands of France’.” (Jarrett, 2014, p. 115). The Austrians wanted to maintain a good relationship with Saxony and use it as a buffer state against Prussia. France’s strategy with the Rhineland was more obscure. To all of Europe, it seemed implausible “That France had, without even debating, abandoned the entirety of the left bank of the Rhine at the treaty of Paris – an opulent land, a large population, formerly attached to the French community, a barrier which seemed to be alone to be able to defend Paris from afar.” (Madelin, 1944, p. 340). All plenipotentiaries in Europe were convinced that Talleyrand would work to recover a part of that fruitful land, but no, it was given away without debate and picked up by Prussia. Talleyrand knew that the Rhineland would not be easily integrated into the Kingdom of Prussia and preferred it to Saxony as a sacrifice for an independent Poland. “The Rhineland of the concordat and of the code civil, catholic and liberal, was at his eyes less easily assimilated to protestant and jingoistic Prussia than Saxony would be.” (De Waresquiel, 2006, p. 486). Talleyrand’s intuitions were correct; in a note to Metternich, a Prussian plenipotentiary said that “Prussia desires, if it is possible, to have no common border with France because, comparatively, on the Rhine, she would always find herself as the weaker.” (De Waresquiel, 2006, p. 486).

Conclusion: Cultural Consequences

France also won a sort of cultural battle at the Congress, which allowed it to remain at the forefront of the European cultural scene. French was the lingua franca of diplomacy, replacing the Latin of the Treaty of Westphalia, and continued to be the language of diplomats throughout the late modern era. All communication between diplomats and every treaty, including the initial Treaty in Paris and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, were in French. The Treaty of Versailles was written in both English and in French. The fluency of the French language by the various diplomats, and the wide berth of its vocabulary, allowed the Congress to be quick, effective and efficient before the time of real-time interpreters in fourteen different languages. “The French language [has] been exclusively used in all copies of the present treaty […].” (Article 120 of the Final Act of the Congress). France was also permitted to retain all artwork they stole from across Europe, especially from Rome, which is now, in large quantities, stored at the Louvre. “So as to manage [French] national pride, Talleyrand finally acquires the conservation of paintings and artworks ‘collected’ across Europe during the military campaigns of the Revolution and the Empire.” (De Waresquiel, 2006, p. 466). Talleyrand was famously mocked for this meagre and forgettable compensation, but it is arguably the backbone of France’s booming tourism sector today.

Klemens von Metternich was perhaps the father of modern multilateral diplomatic culture. The Congress invented, in a way, international, peace-building summits, between many parties. The treaty of Versailles was a debatably failed attempt into securing another hundred-year peace. The conference at Yalta was definitely a better example in securing a long lasting ‘peace’, as much of a peace as the Cold War was. One unique element of the Congress that defined the postwar peace is the fact that the loser had a seat at the table. Sure, the original Paris peace treaty was hailed as a victor’s peace, but the ensuing deliberations in Vienna were anything but. Diplomats and politicians could consider perhaps how rewarding it could be to include their former enemies on the negotiating table (famously German diplomats were excluded at the door at Versailles). That being said, France endured a massive regime change at the end of the Napoleonic wars, which definitely facilitated the task.

Finally, France was able to remain a great power after the war because of the expert diplomatic manoeuvres of Talleyrand, and the great powers of Europe accepted it because in their view it was necessary to have France as a great power to sustain a workable power equilibrium in Europe. The Congress of Vienna was a hard-worked and worthy peace that denied Europe a ‘Great Power Conflict’ for 99 years, but did the brittle equilibrium of powers that was idolised during the Congress allow for the outbreak of one of the biggest and deadliest wars in history in 1914?

Bibliography:

Capefigue, J.-B. (1847). Les diplomates européens.

Chodźko D’Angeberg, L. B. (1863). Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815.

De Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. (1838). Mémoires du prince de Talleyrand.

De Waresquiel, E. (2006). Talleyrand: le prince immobile. Fayard.

Hobsbawm, E. (1962). The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848.

Jarrett, M. (2014). The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon. I.B. Tauris.

Kissinger, H. (1957). A world restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22.

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-    Bellabarba, M. (n.d.). The Congress of Vienna and the Italian Peninsula. In Der Wiener Kongress 1814/15. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

-    Sellin, V. (n.d.). Legitimität und Restauration bei Talleyrand. In Der Wiener Kongress 1814/15. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

French Constitutional Charter of 1814

Paris Peace Treaties of 1814