How can Taiwan adapt to Trump's unpredictable foreign policy?
On the campaign trail, Trump complained about Taiwan’s military spending and semiconductors industry, claiming the country was stealing America’s business and suggesting they should pay for American military aid. The president-elect’s statements could herald an era of tenser relationships between the two countries, as shown by Taiwanese authorities promptly declaring they won’t seek a congratulatory phone call with the president as they had done in 2016, when Trump had spoken to then-president Tsai Ing-wen, breaking a tradition of avoiding leader-level contacts that started in 1979, when the United States first recognized China.
Under Trump’s first administration, U.S. support for Taiwan grew, as both military aid and senior officials’ visits increased. However, things are now set to change, as Taiwan’s greatest assets- democracy and chips- aren’t now as valuable to the president-elect, meaning that the country will have to adjust its approach to secure U.S. support. The key driver of Trump’s new Taiwan policy is rather transparent: weapon sales.
Taiwan’s military spending, which has already been on the rise under pressure from Washington, could now see even sharper growth, as the president-elect has stated that Taiwan should increase its defense budget to 10% of their gross domestic product. However, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) weak legislative majority makes this change near-impossible, and an increase in spending would also clash with President Lai’s domestic priorities, such as the energy transition.
Moreover, Trump stated in an interview with the Washington Post that he was doubtful about how quickly and effectively America could intervene to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. All these claims ultimately lead to the same bottom line: “You have to increase your defense budget. That means you buy more American weapons”, coined aptly by Miles Yu, the former China policy advisor to then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Taiwan’s strategic importance to both the United States and China is deeply rooted in the semiconductors industry, as Taiwan’s companies account for nearly 70% of the world’s semiconductors supply and 90% of the advanced microchips supply.
Under Trump’s new administration, the island’s leading chip manufacturers might face increasing pressure to shift more production on American soil. Another element that makes Trump’s policy on Taiwan highly uncertain is his relationship with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, a mixture of admiration and hostility.
During the first Trump administration, US-China relations strengthened, peaking with the president’s official visit to the Forbidden City in 2017. However, these relations quickly soured when the Covid pandemic broke out, which Trump blamed on China, going as far as calling it the ”Chinese” virus. Trump also ignited the ongoing trade war between the two superpowers, which is far from resolved and is set to worsen with the new proposed tariffs.
Some of Trump’s recent cabinet appointments, such as Marco Rubio for Secretary of State and Mike Waltz for National Security advisors, both outspoken China critics, suggest that the president-elect won’t use his personal relationship with Xi as an opening for negotiation, but rather lean into a more confrontational and rigid policy towards China. For Taiwan, greater tension between the US and China pins it in a precarious balance between provoking China and alienating the U.S., as the nation will face intensified pressure to align with American strategic interests amid significantly higher regional tensions.
Comments