Part I of a series of analyses about developments in Asia, written by members of the Asia Focus Group
Myanmar's Unfinished Revolution
by Giulio Draghetti, Mehmet Ege Öner and Giulia Ristagno
Background
Democracy in Myanmar was established when the province of Burma, as Myanmar was known back then, was separated from British India on April 1st 1937 and the Burmese people were granted an elected assembly. However, the movement for full independence was still gaining popularity, leading to communist revolutionary Aung San’s Burma Independence Army negotiating an agreement for Burmese independence in 1947 with the then British Prime Minister Clement Atlee.
Aung San also negotiated the Panglong Agreement with ethnic minority leaders, granting them authority and the choice to secede after ten years of the founding of the state. However, this agreement was not honored after the assassination of Aung San, resulting in Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to wage insurgencies across the country. The military, also known as the Tatmadaw, eventually overthrew the government in a coup in 1962 and established a one-party communist state, citing fear over the possible fragmentation of the country due to the insurgencies, with the government and public sphere having been under a sort of military control ever since.
Under Tatmadaw control, Myanmar became one of the most impoverished nations on Earth and would eventually end up on the UN’s list of “Least Economically Developed Countries”. Public unrest over the declining political and economic situation eventually culminated in the 8888 protests, named as such due to the key demonstrations on the 8th of August 1988, with the number of casualties throughout the 6-month long uprising estimated to be somewhere between 3,000 and 10,000. Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, made her entrance into the political arena during this time, urging protesters to find peace through non-violent means. Although the Tatmadaw eventually caved into the demands of the people to hold multi-party elections, a coup orchestrated by army generals opposing elections established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which delayed the elections until 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party enjoyed nation-wide support during these elections, receiving 59.9% of the popular vote and securing 392 out of the 492 contested seats in parliament. The SLORC, however, denounced these results as invalid and arrested pro-democracy voices including Aung San Suu Kyi herself.
Under a revised constitution allowing the Tatmadaw to appoint 25 parliamentarians and one of the two vice presidents, new elections were held in 2010. Largely due to the NLD boycotting the elections, the Tatmadaw-backed Union Solidarity and Development party won 259 of the 330 contested seats of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the legislature, and 129 of the 168 contested seats in the House of Nationalities, the upper house. With the participation of the NLD, the 2015 election was the first openly contested election since 1990, and the NLD won 255 seats in the lower house and 135 in the upper house. Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed to the newly created role of State Counsellor due to laws not allowing those with children of foreign citizenship to become president. The 2020 elections saw continuing support for the NLD, who received 3 additional seats in each of the houses of the legislature. The results were, however, denounced by Tatmadaw on claims of voter fraud. International observers from the EU, Japan, the Asian Network for Free Elections and the Carter Center, however, found no major irregularities.
The Coup and Civil War
On the 1st of February 2021, a convoy of armored cars rushed into the parliament complex in Naypyidaw to depose the NLD government and dissolve the parliament, with Aung San Suu Kyi and other key NLD figures being arrested in coordinated raids to their residences. The Tatmadaw then declared a year long state of emergency and appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to the role of Chairman of the State Administration Council, however pledging new elections afterwards.
Mass pro-democracy protests were organized in all major cities to demand the restoration of the civilian government and the release of arrested NLD figures. As early as the 3rd of February, mass civil disobedience, mass protests and strikes in major public sectors like education, healthcare and the civil service were declared. The Tatmadaw responded by deploying riot police and water cannons, declaring martial law and curfews on large cities and towns. The resilient protesters defied the curfews and continued their marches, prompting the police to deploy rubber, and in some cases, live ammunition to disperse the crowds.
The response grew harsher as the protests went on. Demonstrators started to be arrested, and live ammunition became commonplace. A 19-year-old protester became the first casualty after being shot in the head on the 19th of February. Two additional people were killed in the protests in Mandalay the next day. In the second month of the protests, some 200 protesters were besieged by police in Yangon, prompting the UN to call for security forces to be withdrawn. Six days later, Tatmadaw troops killed 65 civilians in Hlaingthaya Township, which was dubbed the Hlaingthaya massacre. 114 people, the highest of any individual day, were killed on the 27th of March and the total death toll rose to 557 on Easter day, the 4th of April.
As crackdowns raged across the country, the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by former NLD lawmakers, and proclaimed as a parallel government in exile. On the 5th of May, alongside forging alliances with EAOs around the country, the NUG formed the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), officially starting the Myanmar Civil War. The NUG went on to declare a state of emergency and launched a “People’s Defensive War” against the Tatmadaw.
Escalation of Hostilities
Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, widespread civil disobedience movements and peaceful protests were brutally suppressed by the military junta, triggering nationwide armed resistance. By mid-2021, the formation of the People's Defense Forces (PDF), aligned loosely with the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), marked a shift towards organized armed opposition. Throughout 2022, the conflict intensified significantly, with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) coordinating closely with PDFs and engaging in frequent clashes with military forces, particularly in the Chin, Karen, Kachin, and Sagaing regions.
In 2023, developments included increased coordination among various ethnic armed groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and groups within the Three Brotherhood Alliance (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army). They launched coordinated offensives, substantially weakening the military’s territorial control.
In 2024, the conflict intensified further, as the resistance managed to push back against the military junta’s offensive and shift the balance of the conflict. Particularly significant Operation was 1027, led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, consisting of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and the Arakan Army, who took over some important territories in northeastern Myanmar and were able to push the junta to their weakest position since the beginning of the conflict.
These gains reflected improved coordination among the ethnic groups involved in the conflict, and a growing incapacity of the military regime to maintain its hold over large areas. The position of the Karen National Liberation Army also improved in the southeast, where they seized the key border town of Myawaddy, disrupting junta-controlled trade routes with Thailand and further weakening the regime's grip.
An Overview of Human Rights Violations During the Civil War
Two years into the conflict, the humanitarian crisis significantly worsened. Attacks against peaceful opposition to the regime intensified, as did the ones against armed resistance. Activists have been put through unjust trials, which resulted in over 1600 sentences of imprisonment, hard labour, or death.
A large part of the country’s population had already been displaced in 2017 when the military junta in power carried out mass killings against the Rohingya people. To this day, more than half a million people have been displaced because of internal armed conflict, and there is an increasing lack of external humanitarian aid. Regardless of the sanctions imposed by multiple countries, the Tatmadaw continues to use military aviation to attack civilians. Moreover, there is still no freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly. Evidently, very little has been done to improve living conditions.
OHCHR also estimates that 120,000 people were held in areas controlled by pro-military militias along the country’s borders with China and Thailand, where they were forced to work in cyber scams and illegal gambling controlled by criminal gangs. Many of the people forced into labour were promised jobs or threatened to shift to Myanmar from neighbouring countries. In November 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) reported letting go of the people working for them along the Chinese border. Still, there has been overall no significant progress in stopping human trafficking. The 3BA alliance was born in 2019 as a union between the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), formed during heavy battles between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State, and members of the Northern Alliance of rebellious groups (MNDAA, AA, TNLA, and the KIA) in Shan state. After the junta’s coup in 2021, the Alliance sought negotiation with the new regime, before breaking the ceasefire again.
Mass Killings and Attacks Towards Civilians
Since 2021, over 4000 people, most of which were civilians, have been killed by the military junta in its attempt to seize power. Mass killings mostly happen through aerial and ground attacks, which harshly strike the civil population. Air strikes are often indiscriminate or targeted at the population itself. In the Sagaing Region, there have been intense attacks, with the deadliest one on April 11th 2023, when the military bombed the village of Pa Zyi Gyi, where people had assembled to celebrate the opening of an administrative office. Over 100 civilians were killed, amongst which were 35 children. According to various media outlets, severe attacks were also carried out in the Bago Region, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Rakhine states.
Investigations on ground operations in the Sagaing Region report extrajudicial executions and sexual violence, including beheadings and mutilation of bodies on behalf of military groups. As reported by Amnesty International, military interventions also used weapons forbidden by international humanitarian law, such as aerial-delivered unguided bombs, whose effects cannot be properly controlled.
Suppression of Freedom of Speech and Media Coverage
Even after the junta’s dismantlement in 2011, important actors within the government strongly limited freedom of speech. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, armed forces commander-in-chief at the time, kept control over the media through censorship and disinformation. He played an important role in spreading hate speech against the Rohingyas, who were the victims of genocide in 2017 in the country. There were no independent outlets to cover the case, and Reuters journalists Wa Kine and Kyaw Soe Oe were imprisoned the following year for having begun an investigation into the mass killings.
In 2021, after the eruption of the Civil War, Myanmar was the country with the most arbitrarily detained journalists, alongside China. After a decade of gradual democratisation and larger press freedom given by the fall of the previous military junta, the trend rapidly reversed. The new junta in power issued a list of banned media outlets, including the Democratic Voice of Burma, best known for its advocacy for press freedom. These portals thus had to resort to undercover reporting techniques, already used in times of military dictatorship. Even though a few media outlets are still relatively keeping citizens informed, the only extensive news source in the country is now government-controlled and spreads propaganda unconstrained. The legal basis for this harsh repression is a vaguely worded section of the Penal Code, which punishes “false information” with three years of prison.
The Western Response
The USA, Canada, the UK, the EU, and Switzerland imposed sanctions on individuals and firms proven to have links to the supply of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. In August 2023, the US threatened to sanction anyone involved in the industry. This resulted in companies transferring jet fuel through Vietnam and Singapore rather than directly to Myanmar. In August 2023, a report by NGO Business and Human Rights Resource Centre uncovered human rights violations in the garment sector, including low wages, gender violence, and dissolution of union activities. Consequently, various clothing companies such as H&M and Zara temporarily suspended operations in Myanmar.
Rising Resistance and Crumbling Junta
Heading into 2025, resistance forces will likely expand their offensives against important economic zones, infrastructure, natural resource hubs, and border trade routes controlled by the military. Continued seizures of strategic, resource-rich areas such as the Kachin, Shan, and Kayin states, could erode the junta's revenue streams and military supply lines further. The weakened junta will probably resort to increasingly brutal tactics, such as intensified airstrikes, scorched-earth campaigns, and random attacks against civilian areas as a way of suppressing dissent and holding onto urban centers such as Yangon and Naypyidaw. These tactics, while temporarily halting resistance advances, are likely to worsen civilian suffering and increase recruitment into opposition ranks. The junta might also try to deepen alliances with local militias and exploit divisions among the resistance groups, particularly between Ethnic Armed Organizations and pro-democracy factions, to weaken the unified opposition.
Illegitimacy of the 2025 Elections
The elections scheduled by the military for 2025, widely expected to be illegitimate, could be a trigger for increased violence. Boycotts by opposition groups and international condemnation will further delegitimize the junta and result in an escalation of domestic protests and international sanctions. Elections designed to consolidate military rule may anger resistance groups into stepping up attacks on urban and strategic targets in a bid to discredit the electoral process.
International Responses and Divisions
International response to Myanmar's conflict will likely remain fragmented. Western countries will continue to strengthen their sanctions and assistance to the NUG, including financial support and possibly non-lethal supplies to the resistance. Regional players will likely focus on stability and economic interests by engaging in diplomatic outreach with both the junta and some resistance groups. ASEAN, which is struggling to find a mediating role, may continue to be sidelined as a lack of enforcement mechanisms undermines its credibility. Being located next to Myanmar, cross-border violence and inflows could steadily increase, making India push toward a more assertive attitude with concerns for stability over political change. China, by contrast, is much more engaged and there is evidence that in late 2024, Chinese premier Li Qiang met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, emphasizing Beijing’s far-from-vested interests in the political stability of Myanmar and its economic revival, particularly where projects and funds linked to the Belt and Road Initiative are concerned.
Economic Collapse and Resource Struggles
Myanmar's economy remains in free fall, and economic contraction is expected to worsen in 2025, with the country’s GDP expected to shrink by a further 2.5%. Compulsory conscription by the military has also exacerbated labor shortages, as people are increasingly fleeing the country to join the resistance or seek asylum abroad, eroding Myanmar's human capital. Economic deterioration will continue to play a leading role in shaping the conflict. As sanctions continue to tighten and foreign investment remains frozen, the junta's access to critical resources will decline further. Resistance groups’ seizure of resource hubs could see the military increasingly dependent on foreign allies like China and Russia for financial and military support. At the same time, however, this support comes with contingencies that put additional stress on what little legitimacy the junta maintains.
Prospects for 2025 and Beyond
While not looming on the horizon, a collapse of the junta in 2025 is nonetheless conceivable, particularly if resistance forces manage to solidify their gains and economic adversities undermine the command structures within the military. However, even with a junta collapse, immediate stability may be elusive for Myanmar, as the fractionalization of the opposition and rebuilding challenges of state institutions could turn a transition into a federal democratic system long, restless, and beset with localized conflict.
The 2024 Bangladesh Revolution: A Country In Transformation
by Lorenzo Rosi
Introduction
On the 5th of August 2024, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a once seemingly invincible leader, was evacuated to India by a military helicopter while thousands of people in Dhaka were assaulting and looting her palace. A scenario that was unimaginable even a few hours before. A true revolution had just taken place in the capital. This episode represented the culmination of months of protests and opened possibilities for a new political course in Bangladesh. It marked the end of 15 years of an increasingly autocratic rule by Hasina and her Awami League (AL) party, but it could possibly be a chance for the country to free itself from its unstable politics, historically characterized by autocratic turns and heavy military interference in the government.
The nation of 170 million people facing the Gulf of Bengal represents an important player on the Asian and Global stage, with skyrocketing economic growth and key value proposition for regional powers like India and China. It’s therefore important to deeply analyze this pivotal event, the causes behind it and its possible implications.
The causes of the revolution
Bangladesh is a rapidly developing country experiencing all the social and economic tensions typical of an industrializing society. On top of this, its history has always been characterized by deep political tensions, linked to religion and democracy. These are the root causes of the events that unfolded during 2024.
Starting from the socio-economic causes, since the 2000s Bangladesh’s economy has grown at an exceptional rate; GDP grew by more than 5% annually (even reaching +7.9%) and GDP per capita followed a similar accelerating pace, surpassing that of India and Pakistan by big margins. The country rapidly industrialized, specializing in the garment sector, lifting millions out of poverty and building an ever-growing middle-class. However, inequality rose as well, with the top 10% of the population owning 41% of all the wealth. On top of this, in the last three years, a combination of slow growth, high inflation and youth unemployment prompted huge protests in the country, with people desiring higher standards of living and demanding pay rises to keep up with increasing prices. Unease about the state of the economy became a consistent problem for the Hasina administration, which until then had received praise from all over the world for its strong economic performance.
The political causes are no less important, and understanding them necessitates a brief history of the country. Bangladesh gained its independence in 1971, when the movement led by the AL and its leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman obtained the secession from Pakistan, promoting an idea of nation based on ethno-linguistic principles and secularism. However in 1975 Mujibur was killed and a coup d’état brought the military, under the command of Ziaur “Zia” Rahman, to power. To legitimize his power, Zia created the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and commenced a policy of de-secularization, declaring Islam as the State religion. Successive coups kept the military in power until 1991, when a movement guided by the AL and the BNP, respectively under Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Mujibur) and Khaleda Zia (widow of Ziaur Rahman), forced the then-president General Ershad to resign and reinstated democracy.
From that point the AL and the BNP aggressively competed against each other, alternating at the government. Distrust between the two parties was so big that a provision was created so that every election would not be foreseen by the incumbent, but by a caretaker government. Even though the parties have similar ideologies, their dynastic nature and historical past created an enormous polarization in the country. Since the AL took power in 2008, Hasina had been undoing, piece by piece, the system of democratic checks and balances. The AL abolished the provision on the caretaker government, took control of the judiciary and State administration, practically canceled the freedom of civic associations, limited the freedom of the press and the right to assemble, crushed protests with violence and imprisoned members of the opposition, including Khaleda Zia. Hasina won by a landslide in the elections of 2014 and 2018, which the BNP tried to boycott. She also pushed for a reintroduction of secularization (even if she had to bow to Islamist movements in some cases) and pursued a “consciousness of independence” ideology that glorified her figure, her party and her father, while at the same time labeling all the adversaries of the AL as enemies of the nation.
All these factors created immense tensions in the country. Unease about the authoritarian and ideological turn and the gloomy economic outlook made Bangladesh a bomb ready to explode, and 2024 provided the detonator.
The unfolding of events
The first protests in the country started at the end of 2023. The people were protesting both for higher minimum wage in response to inflation and against the autocratic government. Elections were due in January 2024 and it was clear to everyone that Hasina would have unfairly secured a fourth consecutive term. The government responded with violence, attacking and killing protesters and arresting a record number of leaders of the BNP, which was leading the movement. Despite facing the most violent protests in decades, the AL went down to win the January election in a landslide.
The unrest continued after this, but it only exploded in June. That is when the Supreme Court reinstated an old policy that reserved 30% of the civil service posts to descendants of the “freedom fighters” of the Bangladesh Independence War of 1971, all loyalists of the AL. A big protest movement led by students took over the streets of Dhaka, demanding the abolition of the quota system. At the beginning of July, the crackdown from the police, the army and AL loyalists became more violent. By July 21, 133 people had been killed. At this point, as protests were only escalating, the Supreme Court was forced to revoke its decision.
However, this wasn’t enough anymore. The violent suppression of the revolts and the exasperation of the population over Hasina’s oppressive rule had transformed the protests into a movement for the resignation of the government. The city was torn apart by the fights, industries went on strike, hundreds of people were killed, the authorities arrested thousands and resorted to violence and torture. But the only effect of the brutality was to increase the unrest of the people.
On August 5 the student leaders called for a “Long March on Dhaka”, whose sole objective was the fall of the Hasina government. At that point, the chiefs of the army understood that the situation was untenable and refused to further defend the government. Without the support of the army, Hasina resigned and fled to India, while the Chief General of the Army Waker-uz-Zaman took control of the country and promised the creation of an Interim government. The impossible had just happened.
In the following hours and days, the protesters assaulted Hasina’s palace, destroyed the symbols of her power (including monuments to her father) and attacked police stations, until the violence was finally partially curbed.
The Interim government and its challenges
The army appointed Muhammad Yunus, an 84-years-old Nobel Peace Prize economist, as Prime Minister of the Interim government on request of the students. Yunus promised radical reforms to reestablish democracy and set up a diverse administration including student leaders and Islamist figures. The challenges of the government are titanic: the country needs reforms in the economy, juridical system, corruption monitoring, constitution and electoral system, among others, while it is also facing heavy floods due to climate change. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Yunus must ensure a peaceful transition and a durable tenure of democracy in the country. Even if the structure of the State still stands, neither of these objectives is easy.
First of all, it is important to highlight that the army of General Zaman is the actual main player in this situation. The army has always been at the center of Bangladeshi politics and it had abandoned Hasina as soon as it believed that defending her was putting their power at risk. Every reform will pass under the eyes of the generals and they will make sure that whoever takes power will be in line with their interests. Yunus is acting under the constant risk that Zaman withdraws his support to the government and takes the situation in his own hands.
Secondly, it is imperative for Yunus to maintain stability in the country, prevent vendettas against the members of the previous administration and preserve the spirit of the student revolution. The BNP and islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami are seizing the opportunity to reinforce themselves and are pushing for harsh punishments of AL members. The risk is that the opposition inflicts to AL the same injustices that it had to endure under the Hasina administration, effectively destroying every effort towards democratization. The country is currently facing an escalation of religion-related violence and many fear that without Hasina the country will go towards a radical islamization.
BNP and Jamaat are also pushing for elections as soon as possible, in order to be able to profit from the revolution and cement their power. As time passes, the support for the non-elected government risks crumbling, as shown by recent protests and violences. If Yunus is forced to call elections too soon, he may not have the time to enforce all the necessary reforms to cement democracy and Bangladesh may find itself in the same situation in the future. Many fear Yunus is not being transparent enough with his timeline.
In these four months considerable progress has been made in all sectors, especially keeping order, but many problems remain unsolved and many tensions could still explode. What will happen is yet to be seen.
Comments