Part II of a series of analyses about developments in Asia, written by members of the Asia Focus Group
The Turbulent Tides of the Taiwan Strait
by Iacopo Brini and Gabriele Catellani
The relationship between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China has been, ever since 1949, one of the foremost crisis hotspots of the geopolitical chessboard. Now more than ever, as conventional warfare makes its grim return to the realm of international relations and the two other fault points, Ukraine and Palestine, have already exploded into open conflict, observers turn their gaze to the Taiwan Straits and wonder once again whether the two Chinas will draw their swords.
Old Rivals
The roots of this confrontation are deep, and one could make the argument that to truly paint a picture of what drives the two Asian powers to lay their claims, the focus should be on the tumultuous period of post-imperial China, from the 1911 Revolution, through the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937) and the autocratic rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) under the principle of dǎngguó (党国, “party-state”), up until the Second World War and the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
Cross-straits relations and tensions, however, began in earnest with the Kuomintang’s Chètái (撤台, “Retreat to Taiwan”): the defeated Republic of China (ROC) evacuated its leadership and what remained of its military and other State institutions to the island of Formosa, or Taiwan, while the victorious Communist Party established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. Though from an historical point of view the civil war ended there, the two Chinas that formed out of this conflict did not share the same idea.
It did not take long for open hostilities to commence once again, with the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954–55 seeing the People’s Liberation Army shelling the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which had remained under ROC control despite being far closer to the mainland coast. The islands were garrisoned by more than 80,000 ROC troops, and the PLA only seized a pair of minor islets in the vicinity before relenting in the face of United States pressure, which materialised through the Formosa Resolution and eventually the 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense pact.
Three years later, the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis (1958) saw renewed heavy artillery exchanges over Kinmen and Matsu; the U.S. military intervened according to the 1954 treaty by supplying the ROC forces with American technology and arms, deploying the Seventh Fleet to the theatre and equipping the ROC Air Force’s F-86 Sabres with the AfM-9 Sidewinder Missiles, which enabled them to gain air superiority over the islands. The conflict waned but never de-escalated completely, with intermittent shelling continuing up until 1979, when the U.S. shifted its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, marking the death knell for Taiwanese diplomatic recognition.
The United States has however retained robust informal relations with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which replaced the 1954 Treaty, which ensured military support through arms sales and a commitment to Taiwan’s security, mostly through the “strategic ambiguity” approach: the U.S. did not openly commit to intervention in Taiwan’s defence, but it also did not openly disavow the possibility.
With the end of military rule and the shift to democracy during the 1990s, the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis marked the highest point in tensions, with the PLA conducting live-fire missile tests remarkably close to the shores of Taiwan and its islands throughout 1995 and 1996, in correspondence with the first free elections being held on the island. As a response, the U.S. deployed Carrier Group 5 and Carrier Group 7 to the Straits, where they remained for the duration of the spat.
The democratization process led to two main political parties emerging as regular contenders in Taiwanese politics, with radical differences in their approach to relations with the People’s Republic: the old Kuomintang, representing more conservative and traditional positions which affirm the Republic of China as the sole legitimate China, and the Democratic Progressive Party, which operates an independence and self-determination platform and vies for Taiwanese autonomy and eventual recognition as a separate state. The issue of Taiwanese independence is, by most metrics, the dominant political question and source of democratic debate on the Island.
The People’s Republic has generally found more agreeable the position of the former, which it intentionally conflates with its so-called “one China policy”, i.e. its claim of having legitimately superseded the former Republic of China; ironically, the Kuomintang’s actual position is precisely the opposite, i.e. that the mainland is occupied by an illegitimate state, but mostly due to the grave imbalance in military power, the KMT is broadly more inclined to treat with China to guarantee Taiwanese self-rule. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on the other hand, holds a stance of maintaining the status quo, i.e. de facto autonomy, with an outlook to future de jure renunciation of any claim to China proper; this strategy also relies on increasing ties with the U.S., which the PRC has made clear it finds distasteful.
![During his 2025 New Year’s message, President Xi Jinping claimed: “We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same family. [...] no one can ever stop China's reunification, a trend of the times.”](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/2340b5_04e3eeb52b584ad49f8919b1586f4915~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_980,h_678,al_c,q_90,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/2340b5_04e3eeb52b584ad49f8919b1586f4915~mv2.png)
Back to the Present
DPP candidate Lai Ching-Te’s victory in the May 2024 Presidential election prolonged an 8-year DPP streak on the Presidency: Ching-te expressed his view that Taiwanese sovereignty is “a fact” under the name Republic of China, and has lambasted the KMT’s policy of strengthening economic ties and dialogue with the mainland as being more friendly to the Chinese Communist Party than his own position. The mainland Chinese position on the election was made clear by a round of live-fire drills and training exercises around the islands, which reached a record one-day total of 153 aircraft, 14 navy vessels and 12 Chinese government ships being employed in Taiwanese waters. China’s Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out military drills for “Sea assaults, land strikes, air defense and anti-submarine [operations] in the airspace and waters to the north and south of Taiwan Island”, which PLA Navy officers described to be aimed at being “a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”
The military situation remains the most significant aspect of the cross-strait confrontation. The disparity of men and arms between the giant mainland global superpower and an island of 24 million people is lost on no one, and much of the political rhetoric in both countries is predicated on the underlying threat of wu tong (武统;), i.e. a military resolution to the dispute.
On China’s side, combat forces are collectively managed under the banner of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and include five main service branches: the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), and the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The PLA employs a Western-aligned, organized approach to combat capabilities, including general deterrence and offensive solutions through a select set of battlefield assets. It can rely on more than 5,228 combat aircraft, most of them fourth generation, as well as 191,070 tanks, 544 ships, and approximately 2 million active-duty personnel, which makes it the largest standing military in the world.
Taiwan, despite being significantly smaller than mainland China, has however developed a technologically advanced military force, focused on deterrence and resilience against invasion. Taiwan's military ranks 24th among the world's military powers, according to the Global Firepower index, which evaluates 145 global powers using over 60 individual factors, including military units, financial status, natural resources, logistical capabilities, and geography. Taiwan’s combat forces operate a similar model to China and most western forces, consisting of five main service branches: the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF), Republic of China Army (RoCA), Republic of China Navy (RoCN), Republic of China Military Police (RoCMP), and the Reserve Force of the Republic of China Armed Forces (RoCAFR). The Navy also supports the Republic of China Marine Corps (RoCMC). It possesses 747 combat aircraft, 25,000 tanks, 97 warships, and approximately 163,000 active duty personnel, with between 1,5 and 2 million reservists and a population generally trained during mandatory conscription, which until 2008 lasted two full years.
It is important to note that the Global Firepower index only considers conventional weapons, excluding nuclear arsenals. According to a 2023 estimate by the Federation of American Scientists, operational nuclear warheads have particularly increased in China and Russia. Analysts estimate China’s nuclear arsenal at 350-410 warheads, with around 100 intercontinental missiles, although it remains modest compared to the U.S., which possesses between 5,244 and 5,500 nuclear weapons. Officially, Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons, though the island has warned China that its Yun Feng missiles could potentially carry nuclear warheads.
The Center for Strategic & International Studies simulated a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026, drawing conclusions from 24 iterations of detailed wargaming: China’s hypothetical strategy would begin with a rapid and overwhelming attack designed to cripple Taiwan’s defenses in the initial stages. Intense bombardments would target Taiwan's air force, navy, and infrastructure, aiming to neutralize resistance, which would be immediately followed by Chinese forces launching an amphibious assault, deploying tens of thousands of troops using a mix of military landing craft and civilian roll-on/roll-off vessels. Airborne and air-assault units would attempt to secure key positions inland to bolster the main beachhead assault.
Despite China's aggressive tactics, the wargames repeatedly showed that the invasion faltered due to logistical challenges and fierce resistance. Taiwan’s ground forces, though heavily outgunned, quickly converged on Chinese landing zones, using the island's rugged terrain to their advantage. Meanwhile, intervention by the United States and Japan proved to be the decisive factor in these wargames, as American submarines, long-range bombers, and fighter aircraft - often operating from Japanese bases - would cripple China's amphibious fleet and inflict severe damage on its navy and air force.
The outcomes of the wargames underscored a consistent theme: while Taiwan’s autonomy was preserved in most scenarios, the cost of victory was staggering. The United States suffered severe losses, including dozens of naval vessels, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service members. Such losses would significantly weaken U.S. military strength and its global strategic position for years. Taiwan endured devastation, with its economy shattered, infrastructure destroyed, and its military severely degraded; this would necessarily entail a collapse of the global semiconductor chain, which would have repercussions of a magnitude rarely seen before in terms of economic crises. For China, the failure to secure Taiwan would come at an even greater cost, with its navy decimated, its amphibious capabilities largely destroyed, and tens of thousands of troops either killed or captured.
The CSIS study identified several conditions critical for a successful defense of Taiwan: firstly, Taiwan must maintain robust ground resistance to counter any Chinese beachheads until reinforcements arrive, emphasizing the need for Taiwan to enhance its ground forces, focusing on training, recruitment, and equipment tailored for asymmetric warfare; secondly, the U.S. and Taiwan must pre-position essential military supplies, as wartime resupply would be virtually impossible. Unlike the "Ukraine model," where the U.S. could send weapons and supplies during the conflict, Taiwan’s island geography and the Chinese blockade would make such efforts unfeasible. The role of Japan is another decisive factor: the U.S. must have access to Japanese bases to launch effective strikes against Chinese forces, as without these forward bases, American air and naval forces would struggle to operate effectively in the distant Western Pacific. Strengthening U.S.-Japan military and diplomatic ties is therefore crucial. Finally, the report stressed the importance of long-range strike capabilities. The ability to strike Chinese forces from beyond the reach of their defensive systems, particularly through long-range anti-ship missiles and bombers, is a vital element for reducing U.S. casualties and crippling the Chinese invasion force swiftly whilst maintaining domestic support for the conflict in the United States.
While the defense of Taiwan seems thus to be technically achievable, the report warned of the high potential for a pyrrhic victory. The high losses and strategic costs for the United States could weaken its global standing, while the economic and humanitarian toll on Taiwan, and the economic fallout for the rest of the world, would be catastrophic. For China, the failure to conquer Taiwan would not only be a military and political disaster but could also destabilize its domestic governance.
Given the possible outcomes and the potential for escalation of such a confrontation, the Taiwan question remains perhaps the greatest hypothetical still unanswered on the geopolitical stage for a good reason: none of the countries involved can foresee a truly victorious scenario stemming from a military resolution of the conflict in the near future.
Taiwan has, of course, no interest in being invaded, but regardless of what brand of opposition to the PRC sits in its institutions (whether KMT or DPP), its main goal will remain to preserve the status quo with China, normalising relations to a degree but most importantly making itself indispensable on the global stage by fighting attempts, especially by the U.S., to reduce global reliance for semiconductors produced in the ‘Taiwanese bottleneck’ of the supply chain. Taiwanese citizens remain confident of their country’s independence and economic capabilities in the short and medium term, and do not seem to be as spooked by the prospect of invasion that the PRC’s posturing in the Straits seems to suggest.
For its part, the United States cannot afford to abandon Taiwan to its fate; besides the staggering loss of geopolitical credibility, as regional allies’ confidence in both American deterrence and response capabilities would evaporate in an instant, the economic fallout of Chinese seizure of the semiconductor industry would be extraordinarily harmful to its economy and those of its allies. This is why Washington, under the Biden Administration, has shifted its ‘strategic ambiguity’ position ever-closer to the ‘strategic certainty’ position, i.e. the guarantee of military intervention, in the face of Chinese aggressive messaging: it is likely that the newly inaugurated Trump Administration will revert to an even more marked, but certainly on-brand, kind of ambiguity, which could be described as ‘strategic unpredictability’: instead of a guarantee of intervention, the threat of preemptive action, strikes and military support to Taiwan will be the preferred means of deterrence.
The Future
The People’s Republic of China remains the unpredictable element of the triangle, though its choices are likely more constrained than what might initially appear: with Taiwan ready to defend itself, but also willing to preserve the current balance, and the United States signalling strongly that its intervention is, if not a guarantee, then a very probable and even unforeseeable likelihood more than a remote possibility, Beijing has very little concrete incentive to squander its military potential on the shores of Formosa, damaging the very industry it aims to integrate and entering into a conflict it is not yet certain it can win.
The future of relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan will likely be strongly influenced by the return of this new Trump administration, whose foreign policy has already been characterized in his first term by an assertive approach toward Beijing. Trump has already shown more direct support for Taiwan compared to his predecessors, strengthening military and commercial ties with the island.
Trump could now adopt an even more explicit stance, intensifying arms sales and promoting greater Taiwanese diplomatic participation on the international stage. However, such an approach could increase tensions with China, prompting it to further strengthen its military capabilities and intensify pressure on the island. This scenario risks further destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, in a context already marked by increasing strategic rivalries.
Looking ahead, the balance between military deterrence and diplomacy will be crucial to avoid an open conflict. Trump’s new term in the White House could lead to more aggressive policies, but also to new attempts at negotiation with China, as demonstrated by his unpredictable style in previous trade negotiations. The main challenge remains ensuring Taiwan's security without triggering an escalation that would compromise regional and global stability.
Tariff Chessboard
by Giacomo Foccacia
The trade conflict between the United States and China, which began in 2018, has never truly stopped. Initiated under Trump, it has continued—with a different approach—under Biden, and now threatens to escalate further with the return of a Republican (and Trumpian) administration.
The Context
From the turn of the millennium to 2017, China’s share of U.S. imports more than doubled, surpassing 20% of total trade. Throughout their trade relationship, the balance has consistently favoured Chinese exporters. In 2018, at the peak of pre-pandemic exchanges, the U.S. imported $420 billion in goods from China, while exporting $120 billion—a ratio of three and a half to one.
Historically, the rules of the game were clear: the U.S., with its vast domestic demand and a reliance on the dollar as the global reserve currency, accepted a persistently negative trade balance. This dependence on imports allowed Washington to exert leverage over trading partners through sanctions. Meanwhile, with its growing but still relatively low domestic consumption, China leveraged its industrial power and trade surpluses to fund its development goals and extend its influence across Africa and Southeast Asia. Further, even if reluctant to admit it, China needs dollar reserves to stabilize its payment capacities, especially given its current economic fragility. This system worked, despite the underlying rivalry, because the economic structures of both nations were somewhat compatible. But, that paradigm has shifted.
In March 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on over 1,300 categories of Chinese imports. By summer, tensions escalated, and sanctioned trade volumes surpassed $100 billion. Total bilateral trade shrank by $103 billion, affecting items such as weapons, satellites, medical devices, aircraft parts, and batteries.
As mentioned, Biden has not reversed the trade war. The bipartisan consensus originates from the need to render U.S. tech sectors more competitive. Concerns over the disruptive potential of emerging technologies—particularly artificial intelligence and its military applications—have heightened fears about American security interests. Unsurprisingly, Biden’s administration has focused on protecting the semiconductor sector, the “raw materials” of the digital economy (see measures like the 2020 AI Act and incentives for reshoring industrial facilities).
In September, the administration expanded its sanctions under USTR Section 301, targeting products like magnets, critical minerals (e.g., graphite), and raising existing tariffs. Semiconductor duties were increased from 25% to 50%, electric vehicles saw a quadrupled tariff of 100%, and lithium battery tariffs rose from 7.5% to 25%. A second Trump term—and its protectionist agenda—increases the likelihood of an escalation.
Impact of tariffs on the US economy
During his campaign, Trump proposed a flat 60% tariff on all Chinese imports. For context, 62% of U.S. imports from China were subject to an average tariff rate of 16% at the time (now a flat 20% tariff has been imposed instead). The proposed increase would stall economic growth, reducing American GDP by over 1% by 2026 and adding 2% to annual inflation. Such drastic measures seem unlikely, given their certainly disruptive effect.
Indeed, Trump has softened his stance. By August, he suggested a 20% tariff hike compared to previous levels, which would cost the median U.S. household an estimated $2,600 annually. By November, the figure dropped to 10%, coinciding with his proposed “anti-migrant tariffs” targeting Canada and Mexico. These three—China, Canada, Mexico—are the top bilateral trade partners for the U.S., and many believe such sanctions could harm the American economy more than boost occupation in targeted sectors, as intended by the Trump administration.
Comentários