Part II of a series of analyses about developments in Africa, written by Alberto Pace, a member of the Middle East & Africa Focus Group
Fourth Shore
On the 21st of January 2025, the Libyan general Osama Elmasri was released by Italian authorities shortly after his arrest following an explicit request from the International Criminal Court. Such release was poorly justified by the relevant ministers Matteo Piantedosi and Carlo Nordio (respectively Minister of the Interior and Minister of Justice), and condemned by both the international community and domestic public opinion.
But who is Osama Elmasri and why was he being prosecuted by the Hague at The Hague? Osama Elmasry Elmasri Njeem is a Libyan general who was responsible for administering the Mitiga prison and other immigrant detainment facilities in Libya, where he allegedly committed crimes against humanity and war crimes. His role within the current Libyan government has, however, made him a relevant figure in the political landscape, rendering his arrest by Italy increasingly unfeasible. This continues a trend of ICC member states refusing to arrest relevant political actors, granting them some sort of undeserved immunity for the sake of maintaining good diplomatic relationships, such as with France refusing to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu.
There are vested interests for Meloni’s government not to anger Libyan authorities, as Rome has been attempting to get closer to Tripoli for quite some time now, and the previous Italian governments have also decided to step up efforts to regain the preferential relationship that the two countries had before 2011. A closer relationship with Libya would allow Italy to further diversify its natural resources imports to reduce the chance of depending on a single country for oil and gas, a grave mistake that caused soaring prices after the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The immigration crisis is also a strong political motivation that compels every Italian government to further deepen such ties, due to the importance of maintaining the Italy-Libya Memorandum of 2017 negotiated by the then-minister of the Interior Marco Minniti. The agreement focused on countering illegal immigration by providing funds and equipment to the Libyan Coast Guard and has decreased the number of immigrants arriving in Italy from Libyan shores, although it has received condemnation because of alleged extremely poor treatment of immigrants.
In conclusion, the benefits that came with releasing Elmasri outweighed the benefits of arresting him, thus his release should not come as a surprise. With the general weakening of international institutions during this period of history, other such acts are likely to become the norm, not the exception.
Times of Change in Botswana
The nation of Botswana, ever since its independence in 1966, has been considered one of the best-run nations in the African continent, as its president and founder of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Seretse Khama, completely transformed a nation which used to be one of the poorest in the world. Thanks to a series of macroeconomic policies and government regulation in strategic sectors, Khama was able to efficiently exploit the country’s many natural resources such as diamonds, copper, and nickel. Profiting off a very positive decade for the mineral market in the 1960s, Botswana was able to develop critical infrastructure and reduce structural issues that were present in many newly independent African countries, such as poverty, poor wealth distribution, and a very low literacy rate. The statistics show how much Botswana improved during Khama’s rule and the rule of his successors: the GDP in 1986 was eleven times that of 1960, while the GDP per capita increased six times fold during the same period; in the four decades after independence, Botswana experienced a staggering economic growth, among the highest in the world. Among the reasons for such an economic miracle, a fair agreement with De Beers, the leading diamond company in the world, on profits coming from diamond mining, but also large investments in infrastructure and education. It is worth mentioning that the relatively small population of Botswana compared to the great amount of natural resources has definitely made improving the quality of life easier.
It is easy then to understand the great popularity enjoyed by the BDP throughout the country’s entire period of independence; the party has remained in power ever since 1966 without rigging the elections, a remarkable streak for any democratic country. But the popularity of the BDP started declining as the economic boom ended in the 1990s, as when the country experienced its first negative economic growth in its history. In the 1994 elections, the BDP suffered its worst result ever, only winning 26 out of the 39 contested seats. While this decline would stop in the following years, BDP popularity would never fully recover, as the opposition parties enlarged their support base and became more of a threat to the party’s political dominance. There are several causes for the decline in support for the BDP in the following decades. There has been a strong correlation between support for the ruling party and the economic situation, which negatively impacted the party’s popularity, especially during the post-2008 crisis period when the BDP imposed austerity measures, triggering the longest strike in the country’s history. Moreover, while strong internal factional infighting within the political opposition had initially allowed the BDP to present itself as the only possible choice to rule the country (something underscored by the BDP slogan “There is still no alternative”) and benefit from the country’s majority electoral system, the creation of a unified opposition nullified such an advantage.
The moment the opposition coalesced into the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), the results were very evident in the 2014 general elections, as the BDP had its worst electoral result so far and the opposition solidified its control over the constituencies. Despite a comeback in the 2019 general elections, the party had lost part of its rural support, fundamental to winning seats in the country’s electoral system. This was evident in 2024, as the BDP unexpectedly lost 90% of its seats, reducing it to a minor party in Botswana’s politics. The causes are mostly linked to economic reasons, such as soaring unemployment and a decline in the diamond market that has resulted in economic stagnation, but there are also other reasons connected to the long period the BDP has stayed in power, for example the lack of new significant policies to solve the current crisis and the will to see something new and different. On the electoral side, the lack of geographical concentration of BDP voters in specific regions has caused them to lose many seats in the “first past the post” system, awarding many seats to the opposition that had instead managed to solidify control in specific regions. The defeat of the BDP follows a trend in southern Africa politics, following the defeat of the African National Congress in South Africa, and possible hardships envisioned for SWAPO in its re-election in Namibia.
The new president of Botswana, Duma Boko, now faces many challenges, as the country must diversify its economy away from diamond exports or risk seeing a continuation of a stagnation that could persist as long as the diamond market stagnates. There are many proposals on the table, such as doubling the minimum wage and generally increasing social spending, but we have yet to see whether they will be able to help the country’s economy and society.
The Fall of Goma
December 2024 marked the end of the ceasefire between Congolese forces and the March 23 Movement (M23), a Rwanda-supported guerrilla movement primarily operating in the North Kivu province. The group has been fighting against Kinshasa ever since their first revolt in 2012; it was initially a splinter of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), but citing a poor implementation of the 2009 peace agreements which established the integration of CNDP members into the Congolese army, it revolted against the government and started to take control of several towns in the North Kivu province, going as far as to capture Goma, the provincial capital. However, thanks to the joint action of the UN and the Democratic Republic of Congo, they were mostly forced out of the area and fled to nearby Rwanda and Uganda. After being dormant for almost 10 years, M23 resumed hostilities against the UN and the government through a series of attacks in late 2021 and 2022; they then started to take over several settlements and even some military bases, allowing them to acquire military-grade weapons. They now control a very strategic region in sub-Saharan Africa, at the crossroads between Uganda, Rwanda, and Congo, a position further improved by the capture of Goma in early 2025.
Commentaires