Part I of a series of analyses about developments in Africa, written by members of the Middle East & Africa Focus Group
Chaos in the Sahel
by Alberto Pace
Sahel's Past
The region of Sahel has varying borders, depending on the various definitions. Broadly speaking, it borders the Sahara Desert to the South, stretching from Senegal to Sudan and including the nations of Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania. This area has become increasingly important over the last decades due to its natural resources, spanning from gold to uranium and oil.
The Western part of the Sahel was colonized by France from the late 19th Century until 1960, creating several multinational states that were doomed to be unstable, due to an underdeveloped economy that was over reliant on the primary sector, and also because of a plethora of ethnic groups and religions. But while France officially withdrew from the region relatively early, its presence persisted, primarily through economic channels, as the newly independent countries adopted the CFA Franc, a currency directly controlled by Paris and pegged to the Franc (and now the Euro). The CFA Franc and the presence of French mineral companies allowed France to import raw resources at preferential rates, especially uranium, fundamental for the nuclear power plants that generate most of French electric power. Paris’ extensive influence has been maintained in the region for the entirety of the 20th Century; the French have been responsible for several military coups, aimed at maintaining their influence, often at the expense of popular local leaders that wished to nationalize natural resources. Both Russia and China have been actively attempting to replace French and American influence in the area, with varying degrees of success, as Russia provides military support through its mercenary company Wagner, while China provides economic support through loans and investments.
This introduction to the region’s history allows us to understand why the vast majority of the population harbors resentment towards the French, allowing other countries such as Russia, China and the UAE to exercise their soft power and reel these nations into their sphere of influence. The structural factors of instability the nations in the Sahel have, combined with a leading political class that has favored their personal interests and the interests of a foreign power, has rendered the area extremely unstable, providing a conducive environment for several islamist insurgencies that are thorns in the back of countries in dire need of stability to facilitate economic growth and attract foreign investments.
Islamic insurgencies and their roots
Islamic insurgencies started to emerge in the Sahel region ever since the end of the Algerian Civil War in 2002. Since the 1990s, the Muslim world has witnessed the rise of several Islamist groups, including in Algeria, with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) launching a series of terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing the nation during the 2000s.
Despite starting as a local group, the GSPC eventually joined forces with Al-Qaeda, becoming the ‘Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM) in 2007. This allowed them to systematically expand their operations to other countries such as Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad, with the explicit aim of overthrowing the incumbent national governments. The Libyan Civil War and the consequent influx of Tuareg fighters and weapons into Mali further worsened the instability in the country, as the government lost control over the northern part of Mali and Islamist groups took control of key cities and resources. From Mali, the insurgency spread to Niger and Burkina Faso, with rebels controlling large swaths of territory and posing a real threat to the local governments. But why did the conflict spread so quickly in such a vast area, characterised by diverse climates, ethnic groups and political situations?
Sahel has widespread tensions over land, poverty and unemployment, in addition to the illicit arms and drugs trade that exacerbates the instability of the Sahel, enabling organized crime and Islamist militias to easily gain access to weapons, further wreaking havoc in the region. These trades also fuel government corruption and consequently citizens’ anger, which can be exploited by local militias for recruitment purposes. Such anger is also the result of the mistreatment of certain ethnic minorities, as is the case with the Fulani in Mali, who are nomadic Muslims that initially supported the government but are now starting to join jihadist groups following widespread violence against them by the pro-government militias.
The failure of the governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to address these critical issues led to popular unrest and eventually to a chain of military coups that have installed dictators who promise to finally put an end to this long-lasting social, economic, and political crisis. To do so, they have found new partners, which have been spreading their influence in the continent.
A New Italian-African Approach: B.F. Holding and the Mattei Plan
by Francesco Maffei
As soon as the Meloni government was formed in October 2022, the Prime Minister oriented her foreign policy on a new Italian-African partnership approach, developing the so-called ‘Mattei Plan’, in honour of Enrico Mattei, the founder of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, the Italian state oil company. Interestingly, it is not possible to outline the structure and the aim of the plan, because a tangible and concrete document explaining them has never been produced, or, at least, it was never published. The only information available about the Mattei Plan are a few Italian laws that only manage to give a broad and superficial idea. The Decreto Legge n°161 of November 15, 2023, converted with the law n°2/2024, states that the plan consists of a programmatic-strategic document that promotes development projects in African countries. The plan has a deadline of four years, so 2027, and can be renewed.
During his speech at a public assembly about the Mattei Plan, , the diplomatic advisor to the Italian President of the Council and coordinator of the Mattei Plan Mission Structure for Africa, Fabrizio Saggio, affirmed that 2025 will be the year in which Italy will accelerate the internationalization of the Mattei Plan, particularly through collaborations with the European Union via the Global Gateway program and the PGII (Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment) of the G7. The combined and focused efforts of Italy, EU and G7 could have finally delivered a serious and concrete counter response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, as of March 2025, neither the Global Gateway programme nor PGII - launched respectively in 2021 and 2022 - have been able to substantively define their goals and ambitions.
Despite the lukewarm response, the case of B.F. Holding paints a reassuring picture. B.F. Holding S.p.A. is an Italian firm based in Jolanda di Savoia, Ferrara, constituted back in 2014 as a consequence of the restructuring of Bonifiche Ferraresi, which itself was established back in 1871. As of March 2025, B.F. is the largest and most prominent Italian group actively involved in the agro-industrial field, joined by some of the most notable Italian economic players, such as the banking-related Fondazione CARIPLO, ENI natural energies – part of ENI group, the pharmaceutical Dompé Holding Group and Intesa San Paolo, the second largest Italian bank by market value.
In July 2024, several Italian journals reported that B.F. has reached an agreement with the Algerian government to cultivate about 36 thousand hectares in the region of Timimoun, across the Sahara desert. The contract was signed by Algerian agriculture minister, Youcef Chorfa, the general director of the Algerian investment fund for agriculture, Souad Assaous, and B.F.’s CEO, Federico Vecchioni, with the presence of the Italian agriculture minister, Francesco Lollobrigida. For the B.F. group, this public-private partnership represents the largest investment made so far in Africa. The project, worth 420 million euros, involves the cultivation of both durum and soft wheat on approximately 70% of the land, while the remaining area will be used for legume cultivation. All the produce will be intended for the local market, and B.F. assures that no hectare will be used for biofuel production.
This partnership is the most considerable outcome reached by the Italian government through the Mattei plan as an attempt to promote and strengthen relationships among the peninsula and strategic partners. For obvious reasons, Algeria is one of them. In Rome’s plans, cooperation with this African country has to materialise primarily in two strategic fields: food and energy. After the Russian-Ukrainian war and the consequent rise of oil prices, Italy had to reconsider its energy supply-chains and the new main partner naturally became Algeria, with whom it shares one of the two gas pipelines – the other is the TAP, Trans Adriatic Pipeline, from Azerbaijan to Apulia – which is vital for fulfilling Italian gas demand. As of March 2025, ENI is one of the largest foreign oil companies operating on Algerian soil, annually producing 23 billion barrels of oil, 3.4 billion cubic meters of gas, and 10 MW of energy through the Bir Reeba North site. It has joint ventures and other commercial relations with the Algerian state-owned oil company Sonatrach, the largest African shareholder company and owner of the Augusta refinery in Sicily.
These agreements represent an efficient way to strengthen the relationship between Italy and Algeria, binding both countries in strategic sectors; Italy can receive energy at a lower price compared to the market, and Algeria can finally solve its chronic food shortage.
Somaliland’s Path to Statehood: What is next?
by Maxwell Crola
Somaliland, a self-proclaimed sovereign republic since 1991, has long sought international recognition, but it is mostly ignored by the wider international community, which still considers it part of Somalia. Recent developments, including the election of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) as president in November 2024, as well as increased interest from the United States, indicate that Somaliland's drive for sovereignty may soon approach an important turning point.
The Trump administration's indication of a potential alteration in U.S. policy regarding the recognition of Somaliland—motivated by Trump's focus on strategic alliances and the administration's heightened interest in countering Chinese and Iranian influence in the region—may result in augmented diplomatic support, economic investment, and security collaboration, thereby enhancing Somaliland's global standing. This piece will look at Somaliland's history, contemporary political dynamics, and evolving relationship with foreign powers, with a special emphasis on the United States' rising influence in shaping the country's future.
Overview
Somaliland is a region in the Horn of Africa, positioned on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden, bordering Djibouti to the northwest, and Somalia to the south. Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 and now functions as a “de facto independent entity” with its own government, military, and institutions, despite not being acknowledged as a sovereign state by the international community. After the fall of the Somali central government, this northern Somali region proclaimed its independence from the rest of the country. Although Somaliland enjoys considerable autonomy, the UN has yet to recognize it despite its long-standing efforts for international recognition.
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